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Side-by-side MCP evidence comparison
Evidence fieldRufloWatchlist candidateJADX-AI-MCP (Part of Zin MCP Suite)MCP100 Selected
Task fit
Best for
  • Advanced coding-agent users who need Ruflo's multi-agent orchestration, memory and coordination capabilities and intentionally use its MCP integration.
  • Navigating JADX decompilation, searching APK code, and accelerating reverse-engineering or security-analysis hypotheses
Not ideal for
  • Users looking for a small single-purpose MCP server with a minimal permission/context footprint.
  • Definitive vulnerability certification, dynamic analysis, or reviewing applications without authorization
Avoid when
  • Do not publish the project's advertised MCP/tool counts as Runtime Verified or a measured Context Footprint.
  • APK contents, decompiled code, or findings cannot be shared with the connected AI client
Provenance
Provenance details

First-party MCP

github:ruflo-app · Publisher source ↗

Community implementation

github:zinja-coder · Publisher source ↗

Maintenance
Maintenance details

Stale

Repo: Not documented

Package: Not documented

Repo: Aug 6, 2026

Package: Not documented

Popularity evidence
GitHub starsNot documented

2,664

GitHub stars · checked 2026-08-14T18:46:26.000Z

Client coverage
Client coverage detailsNot documented
Claude CodeLocal stdio
Claude DesktopLocal stdio
CodexLocal stdio
VS CodeLocal stdio
CursorLocal stdio
OpenCodeLocal stdio
Client coverage noteLocal stdio runs on your computer. Streamable HTTP connects to a remotely hosted MCP server.
Access and data
AuthenticationDepends on the selected Ruflo deployment, model providers and integrated services; exact secrets must be bound from project/local evidence.The documented default is stdio with the HTTP endpoints on 127.0.0.1. The publisher explicitly warns that binding the MCP server to 0.0.0.0 or another non-localhost address exposes plain HTTP with no authentication or TLS, allowing anyone on that network to invoke all tools.
CostOpen-source framework; model/API/infrastructure costs depend on configured providers.The publisher distributes the project under the Apache License 2.0 and lists no MCP server usage fee. JADX, local compute, the selected MCP client, and model-provider costs can still apply.
PermissionsPotentially broad coding/project execution authority across orchestrated agents and integrations.The published tools can read decompiled code for classes and methods, smali, AndroidManifest.xml, string and resource files, cross-references, and debugger frames, threads, and variables from the project open in JADX. They can also rename classes, methods, fields, packages, and variables within the JADX analysis workspace.
Data handlingProject code, agent memory and orchestration context can flow through configured model/providers and persistence layers.The publisher's architecture sends tool requests from the LLM client through the Python MCP server over HTTP to the JADX-GUI plugin, then returns source, resource, manifest, and debugger data to the connected client. The reviewed README does not document telemetry, retention, or model-training use, so those behaviors remain unknown.
Limitations
Tradeoffs
  • Promoted after strict re-audit: canonical identity and MCP-native/publisher-backed implementation are sufficiently evidenced, with real workflow value, usable documentation, understandable permissions, plausible maintenance, and no unresolved security veto. Still not strong enough for Selected.
  • JADX integration speeds static exploration, but decompilation is imperfect and AI-generated security conclusions can contain false positives or miss runtime behavior.
Risk contextBroad agent execution/orchestration and rapid evolution create a substantially larger trust surface than a narrow read-only MCP.This server exposes sensitive reverse-engineering material and mutation tools for the APK project open in JADX. Keep both connections on 127.0.0.1 and prefer stdio; if remote access is unavoidable, use a trusted isolated network plus firewall or SSH tunnel. Treat decompiled source, resources, manifests, and debugger values as potentially confidential, and review rename operations before saving or exporting analysis artifacts.
Evidence date
Editorial review2026-09-13T00:00:00Z2026-08-11
Candidate evidence2026-09-13T00:00:00Z2026-08-14T18:46:26.000Z

Popularity, maintenance, fit, permissions, and client support are independent evidence fields.

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