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Side-by-side MCP evidence comparison
Evidence fieldSerenaWatchlist candidateDocker MCP GatewayMCP100 Selected
Task fit
Best for
  • Developers working in larger codebases who want symbol-aware MCP retrieval and editing instead of line-based tooling.
  • Running multiple MCP servers behind one stdio connection
  • Isolating catalog MCP servers in containers with restricted privileges and resources
  • Centralizing server profiles, secrets, OAuth, logs, and call traces
Not ideal for
  • Users who need a broadly proven, low-risk, fully mature Selected-grade integration today.
  • Users who need only one simple remote MCP endpoint
  • Hosts where Docker Desktop or Docker Engine cannot run
Avoid when
  • Avoid high-impact or sensitive production use unless the documented authentication, permissions, rollback, and data handling match your environment.
  • You cannot review every downstream MCP server and profile permission
  • The agent must not be able to discover or add tools dynamically
  • Container isolation is being treated as protection from an over-privileged downstream credential
Provenance
Provenance details

First-party MCP

io.github.oraios · Publisher source ↗

First-party MCP

Docker · Publisher source ↗

Maintenance
Maintenance details

Stale

Repo: Not documented

Package: Not documented

Repo: Aug 13, 2026

Package: Not documented

Popularity evidence
GitHub starsNot documented

1,529

GitHub stars · checked 2026-08-14T18:46:26.000Z

Client coverage
Client coverage detailsNot documented
Claude Code✓ Local stdio
Claude Desktop✓ Local stdio
Codex✓ Local stdio
VS Code✓ Local stdio
Cursor✓ Local stdio
OpenCode✓ Local stdio
Client coverage noteLocal stdio runs on your computer. Streamable HTTP connects to a remotely hosted MCP server.
Access and data
AuthenticationLocal codebase access is generally controlled by the local process/client; any external provider credentials depend on configuration.The gateway handles downstream server credentials and OAuth flows. The client connects locally over stdio by running `docker mcp gateway run`, optionally with a named profile.
CostOpen-source project; model/provider and development infrastructure costs are separate.The open-source gateway documents no standalone usage fee. Docker Desktop licensing, Docker AI Governance invite-only features, container infrastructure, downstream MCP services, and AI-client charges may apply.
PermissionsCan read and modify the checked-out codebase and may invoke development tooling, depending on enabled Serena tools.The gateway exposes the servers and tools included in the selected profile. It starts catalog servers in containers with restricted privileges, network access, and resource usage, injects configured secrets, and can support OAuth. Dynamic MCP can additionally expose tools that discover, add, configure, remove, and execute servers during a session.
Data handlingSource code/context is exposed to the connected AI client/provider; local project configuration controls what Serena can access.Tool requests and results pass through the local gateway to downstream MCP containers or remote services. Docker documents built-in logging and call tracing. Credentials are managed and injected by the gateway; downstream servers can still receive data and reach networks allowed by their configuration.
Limitations
Tradeoffs
  • Local write/process authority and governance remain material for a broad Selected recommendation.
  • Gateway isolation improves lifecycle and credential management but adds Docker runtime complexity and local resource use.
  • The MCP Toolkit is documented as Beta, and Dynamic MCP is experimental.
  • The gateway reduces direct host privileges, but network access and injected credentials still let downstream servers affect external systems.
Risk contextLocal write/process authority and governance remain material for a broad Selected recommendation.Gateway safety is only as strong as the selected profile, catalog provenance, tool filters, network policy, and downstream credentials. Disable experimental Dynamic MCP unless required, use narrow profiles, verify signatures where available, inspect traces, and treat each downstream server as a separate trust decision. This review does not claim MCP100 execution testing.
Evidence date
Editorial review2026-09-13T00:00:00Z2026-07-24
Candidate evidence2026-09-13T00:00:00Z2026-08-14T18:46:26.000Z

Popularity, maintenance, fit, permissions, and client support are independent evidence fields.

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