Aave MCP — Watchlist | MCP100 Index

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Aave protocol reads and non-custodial transaction preparation: Do V3 and V4 outputs keep transaction preparation separate from user signing and execution?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Official Aave v3/v4 and governance data plus simulation/unsigned transaction preparation.

What we know

Remote Aave MCP for markets, wallet positions, rates/history, governance and transaction preparation. It never holds private keys or signs; action tools return unsigned transaction requests/EIP-712 typed data for the user's wallet to approve.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@aave/mcp 1.0.0 published 2026-09-02T16:25:37.036Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Read Aave data plus preparation of real asset-moving transactions. Writes: Prepare supply/borrow/withdraw/repay/collateral/liquidation/swap transaction payloads.
No MCP credential; wallet signs externally.
Sensitive access: Wallet positions, Financial strategy

No direct signing custody, but prepared DeFi transactions can have significant financial consequences once approved.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do V3 and V4 outputs keep transaction preparation separate from user signing and execution?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Aave protocol reads and non-custodial transaction preparation and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

No direct signing custody, but prepared DeFi transactions can have significant financial consequences once approved.
Read Aave data plus preparation of real asset-moving transactions.
No MCP credential; wallet signs externally.
Wallet addresses and protocol queries are processed by Aave MCP; private keys remain in the user's wallet.
Reviewed write actions: Prepare supply/borrow/withdraw/repay/collateral/liquidation/swap transaction payloads
Sensitive access: Wallet positions, Financial strategy
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
Prepared actions can move real assets once the user's wallet signs them.
Server has no custody/private-key access.
Endpoint is shared/keyless today, so clients must handle rate limits.
Live tool schemas should come from `tools/list`.
Do not describe the MCP as executing/signing transactions; it prepares unsigned actions for the user's wallet.

Original activity observations

@aave/mcp 1.0.0 published 2026-09-02T16:25:37.036Z

Technical identity

npm/@aave/mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@aave/mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Package identity: npm:@aave/mcp
Service endpoint: https://mcp.aave.com

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry metadata ↗
@aave/mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Evidence source ↗
www.aave.com/blog/introducing-aave-mcp-server
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
www.aave.com/docs/mcp
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
aave.com/docs/mcp/getting-started
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Warning

Hosted finance service may expose signing/order preparation; avoid any transaction test.
Aave prepare_ tools produce unsigned transaction payloads; submitting a signed transaction is never a connectivity check.
Reviewed actionability is baseline documentation only; client compatibility and runtime operation have not been verified.
Literal command/entry path confirmed against official README; does not validate runtime or host compatibility.
Prior reviewed safety note: Do not send transactions, sign orders or approve tokens merely to check connection.
Prior reviewed safety note: Do not submit transactions as verification.
Prior reviewed safety note: Do not delete user data or assume this cancels upstream authorizations.
Client removal, software uninstall, persistent-data deletion and credential revocation are separate actions.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher presents the hosted MCP endpoint as the connection path; this is an HTTP registration, not local npx install.
client registration · Claude Code only · Publisher instructions
claude mcp add --transport http aave https://mcp.aave.com
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Use official remote Streamable HTTP URL https://mcp.aave.com; no locally installed package required.
Check connection
Suggested check
Confirm tools and read-only market/health factor lookup; do not prepare or sign transactions.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered in Claude Code under the name `aave`, remove the client entry with `claude mcp remove aave`. For other MCP hosts remove the matching server/connector in that host’s MCP settings. Remove a globally installed software package separately if applicable; this does not delete data or revoke a service credential.
Client removal, software uninstall, persistent-data deletion and credential revocation are separate actions.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove aave

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Remote Aave MCP for markets, wallet positions, rates/history, governance and transaction preparation. It never holds private keys or signs; action tools return unsigned transaction requests/EIP-712 typed data for the user's wallet to approve.

Capability: Finance & Payments
Resource type: MCP Server
Industry: Financial Services & Investing
Best fit: Official Aave v3/v4 and governance data plus simulation/unsigned transaction preparation.

Representative uses

Inspect wallet positions/health factor
Compare supply/borrow rates
Simulate supply/borrow/withdraw/repay/collateral/liquidation
Prepare unsigned transactions
Read governance and GHO-related data

Limitations

Prepared actions can move real assets once the user's wallet signs them.
Server has no custody/private-key access.
Endpoint is shared/keyless today, so clients must handle rate limits.
Live tool schemas should come from `tools/list`.
Do not describe the MCP as executing/signing transactions; it prepares unsigned actions for the user's wallet.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: No MCP credential; wallet signs externally.
Permissions: Read Aave data plus preparation of real asset-moving transactions.
Data handling: Wallet addresses and protocol queries are processed by Aave MCP; private keys remain in the user's wallet.
Cost: protocol_transactional
Risk and cautions: No direct signing custody, but prepared DeFi transactions can have significant financial consequences once approved.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Prepare supply/borrow/withdraw/repay/collateral/liquidation/swap transaction payloads
Sensitive access: Wallet positions Financial strategy
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Inspect wallet positions/health factor; Compare supply/borrow rates; Simulate supply/borrow/withdraw/repay/collateral/liquidation; Prepare unsigned transactions; Read governance and GHO-related data.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded endpoint: https://mcp.aave.com. Recorded transport: streamable_http. Prerequisites: Remote-MCP-capable client; wallet for signing prepared actions. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: No server API key; final execution requires user wallet signature outside MCP.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Prepare supply/borrow/withdraw/repay/collateral/liquidation/swap transaction payloads. Recorded permission boundary: Read Aave data plus preparation of real asset-moving transactions.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Wallet addresses and protocol queries are processed by Aave MCP; private keys remain in the user's wallet. Recorded sensitive-access context: Wallet positions; Financial strategy.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

No direct signing custody, but prepared DeFi transactions can have significant financial consequences once approved. Prepared actions can move real assets once the user's wallet signs them. Server has no custody/private-key access. Endpoint is shared/keyless today, so clients must handle rate limits. Live tool schemas should come from `tools/list`. Do not describe the MCP as executing/signing transactions; it prepares unsigned actions for the user's wallet. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.

What cost model is recorded?

The reviewed cost model is protocol transactional. This classification does not establish current prices, quotas or the cost of every downstream operation. Check the applicable service terms before authorizing paid actions.