Airtable MCP Server — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Dated implementation activity and relevant MCP role justify continued Radar monitoring.

Reviewed Oct 9, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Read and update Airtable bases, records and schema

What we know

Community Airtable MCP with schema inspection, record CRUD, comments and optional HTTP transport.

Maintenance / activity evidence

GitHub REST repository pushed_at 2026-09-09T22:19:23Z for domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server

Tracking evidence observed Oct 9, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes Reported action classes: Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes. Complete write authority is not verified.
Airtable personal access token with selected scopes
Sensitive access: Airtable records, Business data, Token

HTTP endpoint can be abused via DNS rebinding unless protected by auth reverse proxy
Airtable workspace/table access; mutations depend on token scopes; deployed HTTP endpoints require binding/auth and DNS-rebinding protections.
Airtable read/write/delete tokens; HTTP mode has no built-in auth and README warns of DNS rebinding; prefer stdio or authenticated gateway.
Unknown vulnerabilities and client-side tool approvals were not exhaustively evaluated.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

Popularity

456 repository stars

Stars observed Oct 9, 2026.

Repository total for domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server.

All limitations / Review context

At the next review, has this exact implementation gained new releases, changed setup/security scope, or become suitable for Shortlist?

No verified blocker to PUBLIC RADAR TRACKING within the bounded first-party evidence reviewed; material permissions and mitigations are explicitly disclosed.

HTTP endpoint can be abused via DNS rebinding unless protected by auth reverse proxy
Airtable workspace/table access; mutations depend on token scopes; deployed HTTP endpoints require binding/auth and DNS-rebinding protections.
Airtable read/write/delete tokens; HTTP mode has no built-in auth and README warns of DNS rebinding; prefer stdio or authenticated gateway.
Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes
Airtable personal access token with selected scopes
Depends on configured local process, connected account and remote APIs; review first-party privacy terms for any hosted component.
Reviewed write actions: Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes
Sensitive access: Airtable records, Business data, Token
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Unknown vulnerabilities and client-side tool approvals were not exhaustively evaluated.
production authorization and network isolation depend on deployment
Write actions/tool inventory not confirmed against exact tool documentation; listed action classes remain illustrative or context-dependent. Empty inventory does not establish read-only.
Needs Airtable personal access token
HTTP mode has no built-in authentication and is unsafe if browser-accessible
Use least-privilege base scopes
No independent release lifecycle audit; do not claim precise activity date.

Original activity observations

GitHub REST repository pushed_at 2026-09-09T22:19:23Z for domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server

Technical identity

github.com/domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server

Exact implementation source: https://github.com/domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Repository identity: domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 9, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 9, 2026

GitHub repository ↗
domdomegg/airtable-mcp-server
Recorded repository material and project history.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 12, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Warning

Publisher directs users to an external install config generator; package/config verified from embedded README install URL.
This command may start a stdio MCP server rather than registering it; show the publisher client config alongside it, not as a standalone complete integration step.
Use this JSON only with Claude Desktop. Replace credential and path placeholders with your own settings.
Exact vendor-specific credential revoke procedure not established from checked official Setup documentation; may be external or not applicable. Do not invent.
publisher README config shape, placeholders adapted for safety Replace the supplied credential/path placeholders privately; use only the named configuration schema.
MCP100 client-scope note: this Claude Code CLI example applies only to that client and the exact registered name in the command. Desktop, Cursor and other clients use their own configuration; do not run it for a differently named entry.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher-specific setup path. Follow prerequisites, then register or connect to your MCP host.
publisher documented install or connect · Publisher instructions
npx -y airtable-mcp-server
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Publisher recommends install-mcp to generate host configuration; use AIRTABLE_API_KEY personal access token with schema.bases:read and data.records:read.
Advanced configuration · claude desktop json · MCP100 composed guide
claude desktop json · MCP100 composed guide
{ "mcpServers": { "airtable": { "args": [ "-y", "airtable-mcp-server" ], "command": "npx", "env": { "AIRTABLE_API_KEY": "<YOUR_AIRTABLE_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN>" } } } }
Check connection
Suggested check
Check base/table discovery without changing Airtable records.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
Remove `airtable-mcp-server` from MCP host configuration; package uninstall not necessary for npx.
MCP100 client-scope guidance: each CLI removal example targets only its named client and exact registered entry. Package names, Desktop/Cursor configuration keys and Codex/Claude registration names may differ; use the entry you actually registered. Client removal does not revoke provider credentials.
claude mcp remove airtable

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Community Airtable MCP with schema inspection, record CRUD, comments and optional HTTP transport.

Capability: Productivity & Collaboration
Resource type: MCP Server
Best fit: Read and update Airtable bases, records and schema

Representative uses

List bases/tables
Search records
Create/update/delete records
Manage comments

Limitations

Needs Airtable personal access token
HTTP mode has no built-in authentication and is unsafe if browser-accessible
Use least-privilege base scopes
HTTP endpoint can be abused via DNS rebinding unless protected by auth reverse proxy
No independent release lifecycle audit; do not claim precise activity date.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Airtable personal access token with selected scopes
Permissions: Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes
Data handling: Depends on configured local process, connected account and remote APIs; review first-party privacy terms for any hosted component.
Cost: unknown
Risk and cautions: HTTP endpoint can be abused via DNS rebinding unless protected by auth reverse proxy

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes
Sensitive access: Airtable records Business data Token
Risk level: high
Security notes: Airtable workspace/table access; mutations depend on token scopes; deployed HTTP endpoints require binding/auth and DNS-rebinding protections. Airtable read/write/delete tokens; HTTP mode has no built-in auth and README warns of DNS rebinding; prefer stdio or authenticated gateway.

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-09. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: List bases/tables; Search records; Create/update/delete records; Manage comments.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y airtable-mcp-server. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http. Recorded environment-variable notes: AIRTABLE_API_KEY. No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Compatible MCP client. Client notes: Source docs and package may evolve; install according to confirmed release. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Airtable personal access token with selected scopes

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. The partial inventory lists: Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes. Recorded permission context: Create/update/delete records, comments and possible schema changes

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Depends on configured local process, connected account and remote APIs; review first-party privacy terms for any hosted component. Recorded sensitive-access context: Airtable records; Business data; Token.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

HTTP endpoint can be abused via DNS rebinding unless protected by auth reverse proxy. Needs Airtable personal access token. HTTP mode has no built-in authentication and is unsafe if browser-accessible. Use least-privilege base scopes. No independent release lifecycle audit; do not claim precise activity date. Airtable workspace/table access; mutations depend on token scopes; deployed HTTP endpoints require binding/auth and DNS-rebinding protections. Airtable read/write/delete tokens; HTTP mode has no built-in auth and README warns of DNS rebinding; prefer stdio or authenticated gateway. Unknown vulnerabilities and client-side tool approvals were not exhaustively evaluated.