Antideploy MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Antideploy single-application publication tools: Does an app-bound key still prevent deployments or secret access to unrelated applications?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Deploy application directories from coding agents without hand-written Docker/YAML/cloud-console workflows.

What we know

Official Antideploy MCP packages the project directory, deploys it asynchronously, reports build/deploy state and can list/set environment variables. Keys are deliberately app-scoped.

Maintenance / activity evidence

antideploy-mcp 0.1.3 published 2026-09-20T20:04:23.689Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Deploy + secret-write authority for one application. Writes: Deploy application; Set/replace environment variables/secrets; Trigger migrations/infrastructure provisioning indirectly through deploy.
App-scoped deploy key.
Sensitive access: Source code, Environment secrets, Deployment configuration

Deployment has production blast radius and source/secrets leave local machine; app-scoped keys reduce scope.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Does an app-bound key still prevent deployments or secret access to unrelated applications?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Antideploy single-application publication tools and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Deployment has production blast radius and source/secrets leave local machine; app-scoped keys reduce scope.
Deploy + secret-write authority for one application.
App-scoped deploy key.
Project directory is uploaded; `.env` values are placed into Antideploy encrypted secret store and file omitted from build context.
Reviewed write actions: Deploy application; Set/replace environment variables/secrets; Trigger migrations/infrastructure provisioning indirectly through deploy
Sensitive access: Source code, Environment secrets, Deployment configuration
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
The whole project directory is uploaded subject to documented exclusions.
A `.env` is intentionally uploaded to encrypted secret storage unless moved.
Deploys can provision infrastructure such as Postgres and run migrations.
API key can write secrets but does not read them back.

Original activity observations

antideploy-mcp 0.1.3 published 2026-09-20T20:04:23.689Z

Technical identity

npm/antideploy-mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/antideploy-mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Repository identity: antideploy/antideploy-mcp
Package identity: npm:antideploy-mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry metadata ↗
antideploy-mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
GitHub repository ↗
antideploy/antideploy-mcp
Repository reference; implementation attribution is not established for every document.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
antideploy.com/platform/agent-api
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
antideploy.com/
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Warning

Not runtime tested, no third-party installation, network authorization, paid calls, or mutation executed.
Do not claim production service is available based on README alone.
Deployment-related tools: inspect write actions before running
Official npm publisher package page README inspected for this exact npm identity; static research only. Some setup statements are conservatively summarized; no source code or live client execution checked. V2 review did not run any live client.
Check actual host syntax and supply credentials in secure client environment; do not paste placeholders verbatim.
Avoid write, payment, token transfer, publishing, sending, booking and remote account changes as tests.
Replace credential, action and registration placeholders; follow the matching publisher/client prerequisites. No execution performed.
Use the matching host, actual registration name and original installation environment; this does not revoke credentials.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Deployment-related tools: inspect write actions before running | Publisher npm README revisited on 2026-10-14; exact identity retained.
Reviewed setup example · Claude Code only · Publisher instructions · Review before use
```
claude mcp add antideploy -e ANTIDEPLOY_API_KEY=<KEY> -- npx -y antideploy-mcp
```
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
ANTIDEPLOY_API_KEY required; deployment calls can mutate production, do not use as connection smoke test.
Required environment variables: ANTIDEPLOY_API_KEY
Check connection
Suggested check
Verify tool discovery only, not a deployment or rollback.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered by the publisher Claude Code example under `antideploy`, run the provided unregister command; for a different MCP client or name, delete the actual client registration. Removing a local client entry is distinct from deleting a vendor account/token.
Remove named client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove antideploy

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Official Antideploy MCP packages the project directory, deploys it asynchronously, reports build/deploy state and can list/set environment variables. Keys are deliberately app-scoped.

Capability: Cloud & DevOps
Resource type: MCP Server
Best fit: Deploy application directories from coding agents without hand-written Docker/YAML/cloud-console workflows.

Representative uses

Deploy project directory
Poll deployment status
List environment-variable names
Set/replace secrets/environment variables
Inspect platform API info

Limitations

The whole project directory is uploaded subject to documented exclusions.
A `.env` is intentionally uploaded to encrypted secret storage unless moved.
Deploys can provision infrastructure such as Postgres and run migrations.
API key can write secrets but does not read them back.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: App-scoped deploy key.
Permissions: Deploy + secret-write authority for one application.
Data handling: Project directory is uploaded; `.env` values are placed into Antideploy encrypted secret store and file omitted from build context.
Cost: plan_based
Risk and cautions: Deployment has production blast radius and source/secrets leave local machine; app-scoped keys reduce scope.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Deploy application Set/replace environment variables/secrets Trigger migrations/infrastructure provisioning indirectly through deploy
Sensitive access: Source code Environment secrets Deployment configuration
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Deploy project directory; Poll deployment status; List environment-variable names; Set/replace secrets/environment variables; Inspect platform API info.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y antideploy-mcp. Recorded transport: stdio. Recorded environment-variable notes: ANTIDEPLOY_API_KEY; ANTIDEPLOY_URL (optional). No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Antideploy app/account; MCP client. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: App-scoped Antideploy API key; separate device-login flow also exists for broader agent API.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Deploy application; Set/replace environment variables/secrets; Trigger migrations/infrastructure provisioning indirectly through deploy. Recorded permission boundary: Deploy + secret-write authority for one application.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Project directory is uploaded; `.env` values are placed into Antideploy encrypted secret store and file omitted from build context. Recorded sensitive-access context: Source code; Environment secrets; Deployment configuration.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Deployment has production blast radius and source/secrets leave local machine; app-scoped keys reduce scope. The whole project directory is uploaded subject to documented exclusions. A `.env` is intentionally uploaded to encrypted secret storage unless moved. Deploys can provision infrastructure such as Postgres and run migrations. API key can write secrets but does not read them back. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.

What cost model is recorded?

The reviewed cost model is plan based. This classification does not establish current prices, quotas or the cost of every downstream operation. Check the applicable service terms before authorizing paid actions.