APKTool MCP Server — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Track apktool and APK-analysis compatibility with explicit artifact scope

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Authorized APK decoding, inspection and modification workflows

What we know

Community MCP bridge around APKTool-oriented reverse-engineering tasks for Android application packages.

Maintenance / activity evidence

Observed Jul 2, 2026 (UTC)Merge pull request 11 from botnick/windows-support

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: medium.

Activity source · commits ↗Activity source · releases ↗

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Local APK/project file access. Complete write authority is not verified.
Authentication not yet verified.
Sensitive access: APK contents, Signing material if configured

Reverse-engineering and modification capabilities are security-sensitive; isolate workspaces and authorized samples.

Security source · repository notice ↗Security source · policy file ↗

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

Popularity

657 repository stars

Stars observed Sep 25, 2026.

Preserve any already-reviewed adoption metrics in MCP100. Batch 4 did not refresh package downloads because the package-stats provider had insufficient credits.

All limitations / Review context

Which decoding and analysis operations remain supported through MCP?

The bounded assessment reviewed the official README, repository notices, security policy path, and security page for known material public-tracking blockers. No such blocker was identified. This is a public-tracking assessment, not an installation safety certification.

Reverse-engineering and modification capabilities are security-sensitive; isolate workspaces and authorized samples.
Local APK/project file access.
APK content and reverse-engineering artifacts are exposed to the MCP client.
Sensitive access: APK contents, Signing material if configured
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
No independent runtime, installation, or comprehensive security audit was performed.
No installation, runtime, client matrix, or complete tool-contract audit was performed in this review.
Exact install command
Authentication
Current tool list
Only use on applications you are authorized to analyze.
Exact current tool/auth surface should be checked before enabling writes.

Original activity observations

2026-07-02T13:44:27Z: Merge pull request 11 from botnick/windows-support

Technical identity

github.com/zinja-coder/apktool-mcp-server

Exact implementation source: https://github.com/zinja-coder/apktool-mcp-server ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Repository identity: zinja-coder/apktool-mcp-server

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 6, 2026

GitHub repository ↗
zinja-coder/apktool-mcp-server
Recorded repository material and project history.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher requires a multistep setup; follow the source and configuration instructions, no invented one-line installer.
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Install apktool and Python/uv; register the Python MCP launch from the actual repository README configuration. Java APKTool is a separate requirement.
Previously reviewed client configuration / prerequisites: Requires installed Apktool CLI and this source checkout; official Claude Desktop mcpServers launches absolute uv binary with args ["--directory","<ABSOLUTE_REPO_PATH>","run","apktool_mcp_server.py"]. Do not substitute npx or omit absolute paths.
Check connection
Suggested check
Check APKTool version and MCP tool discovery; do not run tools on untrusted APKs in verification.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered in Claude Code under the name `apktool-mcp-server`, remove the client entry with `claude mcp remove apktool-mcp-server`. For other MCP hosts remove the matching server/connector in that host’s MCP settings. Remove a globally installed software package separately if applicable; this does not delete data or revoke a service credential.
Client removal, software uninstall, persistent-data deletion and credential revocation are separate actions.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove apktool-mcp-server

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Community MCP bridge around APKTool-oriented reverse-engineering tasks for Android application packages.

Capability: Security & Testing
Resource type: MCP Server
Industry: Cybersecurity
Best fit: Authorized APK decoding, inspection and modification workflows

Representative uses

Decode APKs
Inspect resources/manifests
Support APK modification/rebuild workflows

Limitations

Only use on applications you are authorized to analyze.
Exact current tool/auth surface should be checked before enabling writes.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Not documented in the reviewed sources
Permissions: Local APK/project file access.
Data handling: APK content and reverse-engineering artifacts are exposed to the MCP client.
Cost: free
Risk and cautions: Reverse-engineering and modification capabilities are security-sensitive; isolate workspaces and authorized samples.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified
Sensitive access: APK contents Signing material if configured
Risk level: high

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-06. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Decode APKs; Inspect resources/manifests; Support APK modification/rebuild workflows.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. Recorded permission context: Local APK/project file access.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

APK content and reverse-engineering artifacts are exposed to the MCP client. Recorded sensitive-access context: APK contents; Signing material if configured.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Reverse-engineering and modification capabilities are security-sensitive; isolate workspaces and authorized samples. Only use on applications you are authorized to analyze. Exact current tool/auth surface should be checked before enabling writes. No independent runtime, installation, or comprehensive security audit was performed.

Is this an official MCP?

zinja-coder is listed as Community implementation in MCP100’s current evidence.