Arcane RMCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Track identity, package activity, privileges, documentation and data handling

Reviewed Oct 10, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Arcane Docker and Compose administration

What we know

Operate Docker containers, images, networks and Compose resources on Arcane through MCP. Arcane Docker and Compose management over MCP and CLI with authenticated stdio and HTTP.

Maintenance / activity evidence

205 downloads from 2026-09-09 through 2026-10-08

Tracking evidence observed Oct 10, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: medium_identity_and_metrics; published-function claims not execution verified.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions. Reported action classes: Manage Compose projects. Complete write authority is not verified.
See package authentication documentation; not independently tested.
Sensitive access: Account or infrastructure data accessible with supplied credentials

Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.
Public listing does not imply a safe runtime or security audit.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

Popularity

· 205 package downloads / 30 days

Downloads observed Oct 10, 2026.

Exact npm package @dinglebear/rarcane; provider interval 2026-09-09–2026-10-08 (inclusive); observed 2026-10-10T17:26:34Z.

All limitations / Review context

Have @dinglebear/rarcane permissions, hosted data retention, publication identity or supported MCP operations changed?

Bounded public tracking review; known consequences disclosed: Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.

Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.
Public listing does not imply a safe runtime or security audit.
See package authentication documentation; not independently tested.
Reviewed write actions: Manage Compose projects
Sensitive access: Account or infrastructure data accessible with supplied credentials
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Operator must review permissions and remote data processing before installation.
runtime_installer_exact
Write actions/tool inventory not confirmed against exact tool documentation; listed action classes remain illustrative or context-dependent. Empty inventory does not establish read-only.
Exact install command and full env contract unverified except where explicitly documented; check official package before running.
Exact npm download observation only; no independent installation test.

Original activity observations

205 downloads from 2026-09-09 through 2026-10-08

Technical identity

npm/@dinglebear/rarcane

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@dinglebear/rarcane ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Package identity: npm:@dinglebear/rarcane

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 10, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 10, 2026

Package registry ↗
@dinglebear/rarcane
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Arcane management gateway requires RARCANE_API_URL and RARCANE_API_KEY.
publisher install or stdio launch · Publisher instructions
npx -y @dinglebear/rarcane mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Publisher: `npx -y @dinglebear/rarcane mcp` with RARCANE_API_URL and RARCANE_API_KEY; `serve` is HTTP mode, not stdio.
Check connection
Suggested check
`npx -y @dinglebear/rarcane status` verifies upstream before MCP client inspection.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
For a Claude Code registration named `dinglebear-rarcane`, run `claude mcp remove dinglebear-rarcane`; otherwise remove the exact entry in the chosen MCP client settings and restart/reconnect. This client-host removal command is MCP100-composed from Claude Code lifecycle documentation, not a vendor-authored uninstall. With `npx`, a separate global package uninstall normally is unnecessary. Do not delete provider data or credentials by default.
Client unregister, package uninstall, data deletion, and OAuth/API token/wallet permissions are distinct.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove dinglebear-rarcane

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Operate Docker containers, images, networks and Compose resources on Arcane through MCP. Arcane Docker and Compose management over MCP and CLI with authenticated stdio and HTTP.

Capability: Developer Tools
Resource type: MCP Server
Best fit: Arcane Docker and Compose administration

Representative uses

Inspect containers
Manage Compose projects

Limitations

Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.
Exact install command and full env contract unverified except where explicitly documented; check official package before running.
Exact npm download observation only; no independent installation test.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: See package authentication documentation; not independently tested.
Permissions: Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.
Data handling: Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.
Cost: Not verified; check vendor terms
Risk and cautions: Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified Manage Compose projects
Sensitive access: Account or infrastructure data accessible with supplied credentials
Risk level: high
Security notes: Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions. Public listing does not imply a safe runtime or security audit.

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-10T17:26:34Z. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Inspect containers; Manage Compose projects.

What setup and authentication are documented?

A complete connection procedure is not verified. Client notes: Never infer missing startup flags or credentials. These facts do not supply missing installation commands, credentials or a verified authentication procedure. Authentication: API credential or authenticated app account required; exact setup should be checked in upstream package

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. The partial inventory lists: Manage Compose projects. Recorded permission context: Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions. Recorded sensitive-access context: Account or infrastructure data accessible with supplied credentials.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Container changes may destroy workloads or reveal secrets; restrict access and explicitly confirm destructive actions. Exact install command and full env contract unverified except where explicitly documented; check official package before running. Exact npm download observation only; no independent installation test. Public listing does not imply a safe runtime or security audit. Operator must review permissions and remote data processing before installation.