Watchlist tracking
Reviewed for relevance and future tracking value.
MCP100 Assessment
Watchlist / Tracking
Why we’re tracking it
Follow browser engine, navigation scope, and disclosure guidance as the project changes
Reviewed · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested
Best fit
Browser automation with browser-use and optional VNC/async tasks
What we know
Community MCP server controlling browsers through browser-use with stdio/SSE modes.
Maintenance / activity evidence
- Observed (UTC)Merge pull request 50 from co-browser/tumberger-patch-1
Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.
Verification gaps / watch-outs
- Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
- Browser session authority. Writes: Navigation; Form interaction; Browser actions.
- MCP endpoint auth unresolved.
- Sensitive access: Cookies, Authenticated pages, Browser state
- Browser automation plus model access can expose authenticated sessions and perform external actions.
Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.
Popularity
848 repository stars
Stars observed Oct 6, 2026.
No canonical package metric applied.
No canonical package metric applied.
No canonical package metric applied.
All limitations / Review context
What browser actions and authorization boundaries are documented at the next review?
The bounded official-source review found no disclosed material public-tracking blocker for the documented browser-use MCP; browser action scope remains an uncertainty and was not treated as a safety certification.
- Browser automation plus model access can expose authenticated sessions and perform external actions.
- Browser session authority.
- MCP endpoint auth unresolved.
- Page/session data and prompts may be sent to configured model provider.
- Reviewed write actions: Navigation; Form interaction; Browser actions
- Sensitive access: Cookies, Authenticated pages, Browser state
- Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
- Browser actions can have consequential effects; no independent runtime or permission audit was performed and no project-specific SECURITY.md policy was available at the fetched path.
- A project-specific SECURITY.md policy was not available at the fetched official path; the review remains limited to published repository notices.
- No installation, runtime, client matrix, or complete tool-contract audit was performed in this review.
- The fetched official SECURITY.md path returned HTTP 404; it was not treated as positive evidence.
- Endpoint authentication
- Canonical package identity
- Browser automation can affect authenticated sessions.
- Exact auth/permission scope is not fully documented.
Original activity observations
- 2025-07-10T09:57:18Z: Merge pull request 50 from co-browser/tumberger-patch-1
Technical identity
github.com/kontext-security/browser-use-mcp-server- Exact implementation source
- https://github.com/kontext-security/browser-use-mcp-server ↗
- Reviewed resource type
- MCP Server
- Repository identity
- kontext-security/browser-use-mcp-server
Evidence & Sources
- Evidence basis
- Recorded source evidence
- Setup runtime verification
- Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.
Reviewed · Latest source observation
- GitHub repository ↗
kontext-security/browser-use-mcp-server
Recorded repository material and project history.
Setup · Watchlist
Install & Agents
claude-desktop
Publisher instructions with a documented client setup path.
Source evidence observed .
Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.
Install / connect
Publisher instructionsLocal browser automation server built from source with uv/Playwright; can expose SSE or stdio.
package install · Publisher instructions · Review before use
uv sync uv pip install playwright uv run playwright install --with-deps --no-shell chromiumConfigure / authenticate
Publisher instructionsBrowser-use MCP requires Playwright Chromium and optionally OPENAI_API_KEY. Publisher documents uv build/install and both stdio and SSE; avoid assuming uvx package without checked distribution.
Check connection
Suggested checkInspect MCP listing with a sandbox profile; do not run destructive browser automation.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guideUnregister MCP host entry browser-server, stop any mcp-proxy and browser service; command applies only when installed via uv tool wheel.
Distinguish client registration removal from software uninstall, persistent data deletion and provider OAuth/API-key revocation.
uv tool uninstall browser-use-mcp-server
What it does
Community MCP server controlling browsers through browser-use with stdio/SSE modes.
- Capability
- Browser Automation
- Resource type
- MCP Server
- Best fit
- Browser automation with browser-use and optional VNC/async tasks
Representative uses
- Open/interact with websites
- Run async browser tasks
- Use VNC streaming
Limitations
- Browser automation can affect authenticated sessions.
- Exact auth/permission scope is not fully documented.
Reviewed access
Access & risk
Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.
- Authentication
- MCP endpoint auth unresolved.
- Permissions
- Browser session authority.
- Data handling
- Page/session data and prompts may be sent to configured model provider.
- Cost
- usage_based
- Risk and cautions
- Browser automation plus model access can expose authenticated sessions and perform external actions.
Access scope and cautions
- Write actions
- Navigation Form interaction Browser actions
- Sensitive access
- Cookies Authenticated pages Browser state
- Risk level
- high
FAQ
Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-06. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.
Which tasks are documented for this implementation?
What setup and authentication are documented?
Can it modify data or perform write operations?
What data-handling boundary should I consider?
What limitations and risks should I check before use?
What cost model is recorded?
Is this an official MCP?
Kontext Security is listed as Community implementation in MCP100’s current evidence.