ComputeBack MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Computeback rewards and B2B labor-market tools: Do per-agent HMAC credentials retain separate authority over earning work and spending rewards?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Agent rewards marketplace for earning $NOMD from B2B work and spending it on agent capabilities.

What we know

MCP for the ComputeBack marketplace and CB Hire workflows: agents can discover/purchase capabilities and participate in paid B2B tasks, using agent DID/HMAC identity and token balances.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@autonomad1/computeback-mcp 1.1.4 published 2026-09-02T00:20:59.160Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Marketplace/token spending plus B2B job workflow authority. Reported action classes: Purchase capability products with $NOMD; Potentially accept/perform B2B jobs; Create marketplace/job state. Complete write authority is not verified.
Agent DID/HMAC secret.
Sensitive access: Agent identity secret, Token balance, B2B work details

Can spend token value and create work commitments; require explicit budgets/approval.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do per-agent HMAC credentials retain separate authority over earning work and spending rewards?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Computeback rewards and B2B labor-market tools and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Can spend token value and create work commitments; require explicit budgets/approval.
Marketplace/token spending plus B2B job workflow authority.
Agent DID/HMAC secret.
Marketplace, agent identity, job and reward data pass through ComputeBack/Autonomad.
Reviewed write actions: Purchase capability products with $NOMD; Potentially accept/perform B2B jobs; Create marketplace/job state
Sensitive access: Agent identity secret, Token balance, B2B work details
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
complete tool/write inventory
token settlement/retention details
Financial/token and labor-market actions can create real commitments.
Exact tool-level transaction semantics were not fully inspected here.
Agent identity/HMAC secret must be protected.

Original activity observations

@autonomad1/computeback-mcp 1.1.4 published 2026-09-02T00:20:59.160Z

Technical identity

npm/@autonomad1/computeback-mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@autonomad1/computeback-mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: Gateway
Repository identity: Autonomad1/computeback-mcp
Package identity: npm:@autonomad1/computeback-mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry ↗
@autonomad1/computeback-mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
GitHub repository ↗
autonomad1/computeback-mcp
Repository reference; implementation attribution is not established for every document.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Gateway setup

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Warning

Financial risk: package may sign and pay for calls or buy tokens. Never use production wallet/private key to test. Obtain explicit spending approval.
A private key is not an API key; do not expose it in project files, screenshots, logs, or chat transcripts.
Hosted gateway may wrap payable compute actions; do not assume invocation is free or idempotent. Confirm account economics independently.
Publisher baseline documentation retained; live recheck unavailable. This update does not establish a fresh publisher-source verification.
Reviewed actionability is baseline documentation only; client compatibility and runtime operation have not been verified.
Literal command/entry path confirmed against official README; does not validate runtime or host compatibility.
Prior reviewed safety note: Purchases consume NOMD tokens on Base; never make a purchase or wallet-signing call as a connection check.
Prior reviewed safety note: Do not delete user data or assume this cancels upstream authorizations.
Client removal, software uninstall, persistent-data deletion and credential revocation are separate actions.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher-documented install or connect path; prerequisites and any extra host configuration remain required.
publisher install or stdio launch · retained baseline · Publisher instructions
npx @autonomad1/computeback-mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Local stdio `npx @autonomad1/computeback-mcp`; platform hosted endpoint is a separate path; tokens can fund purchases.
Check connection
Suggested check
Read-only `check_balance` if authenticated, or provider health https://mcp.computeback.com/health only for hosted reachability; no purchases.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered in Claude Code under the name `computeback`, remove the client entry with `claude mcp remove computeback`. For other MCP hosts remove the matching server/connector in that host’s MCP settings. Remove a globally installed software package separately if applicable; this does not delete data or revoke a service credential.
Client removal, software uninstall, persistent-data deletion and credential revocation are separate actions.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove computeback

Official Documentation & Sources

https://www.npmjs.com/package/@autonomad1/computeback-mcp ↗

What it does

MCP for the ComputeBack marketplace and CB Hire workflows: agents can discover/purchase capabilities and participate in paid B2B tasks, using agent DID/HMAC identity and token balances.

Capability: Finance & Payments
Resource type: Gateway
Industry: Professional Services, Financial Services & Investing
Best fit: Agent rewards marketplace for earning $NOMD from B2B work and spending it on agent capabilities.

Representative uses

Search marketplace products/capabilities
Spend $NOMD on compute/voice/memory/storage
Discover/accept B2B work
Earn rewards for completed work

Limitations

Financial/token and labor-market actions can create real commitments.
Exact tool-level transaction semantics were not fully inspected here.
Agent identity/HMAC secret must be protected.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Agent DID/HMAC secret.
Permissions: Marketplace/token spending plus B2B job workflow authority.
Data handling: Marketplace, agent identity, job and reward data pass through ComputeBack/Autonomad.
Cost: token_transactional
Risk and cautions: Can spend token value and create work commitments; require explicit budgets/approval.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified Purchase capability products with $NOMD Potentially accept/perform B2B jobs Create marketplace/job state
Sensitive access: Agent identity secret Token balance B2B work details
Risk level: high

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Search marketplace products/capabilities; Spend $NOMD on compute/voice/memory/storage; Discover/accept B2B work; Earn rewards for completed work.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y @autonomad1/computeback-mcp. Recorded transport: stdio. Recorded environment-variable notes: COMPUTEBACK_API_URL; BASE_RPC_URL; AGENT_DID; AGENT_HMAC_SECRET. No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Node/npm; registered agent identity for privileged tools. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Agent DID plus HMAC secret for CB Hire/B2B tools; some marketplace reads may require less authority.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. The partial inventory lists: Purchase capability products with $NOMD; Potentially accept/perform B2B jobs; Create marketplace/job state. Recorded permission context: Marketplace/token spending plus B2B job workflow authority.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Marketplace, agent identity, job and reward data pass through ComputeBack/Autonomad. Recorded sensitive-access context: Agent identity secret; Token balance; B2B work details.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Can spend token value and create work commitments; require explicit budgets/approval. Financial/token and labor-market actions can create real commitments. Exact tool-level transaction semantics were not fully inspected here. Agent identity/HMAC secret must be protected. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.

What cost model is recorded?

The reviewed cost model is token transactional. This classification does not establish current prices, quotas or the cost of every downstream operation. Check the applicable service terms before authorizing paid actions.