Watchlist tracking
Reviewed for relevance and future tracking value.
MCP100 Assessment
Watchlist / Tracking
Why we’re tracking it
Follow Docker API and compose-tool changes because container actions are high impact
Reviewed · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested
Best fit
Managing Docker containers, volumes and remote daemons with natural language
What we know
Community Docker MCP for composing, inspecting/debugging containers and managing persistent volumes.
Maintenance / activity evidence
- Observed (UTC)Migrate to MCP Python SDK v2 ( 56)
Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.
Verification gaps / watch-outs
- Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
- Authority of configured Docker daemon/user. Writes: Create/stop/remove containers; Manage volumes; Potential host impact through Docker.
- Docker/SSH environment auth.
- Sensitive access: Docker socket, Container data
- Docker daemon access is effectively privileged infrastructure access even with some dangerous flags disabled.
Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.
Popularity
744 repository stars
Stars observed Sep 25, 2026.
Preserve any already-reviewed adoption metrics in MCP100. Batch 4 did not refresh package downloads because the package-stats provider had insufficient credits.
Preserve any already-reviewed adoption metrics in MCP100. Batch 4 did not refresh package downloads because the package-stats provider had insufficient credits.
All limitations / Review context
Which container operations and approval or scope controls are documented?
The bounded assessment reviewed the official README, repository notices, security policy path, and security page for known material public-tracking blockers. No such blocker was identified. This is a public-tracking assessment, not an installation safety certification.
- Docker daemon access is effectively privileged infrastructure access even with some dangerous flags disabled.
- Authority of configured Docker daemon/user.
- Docker/SSH environment auth.
- Container metadata, logs and volume context are exposed to the client.
- Reviewed write actions: Create/stop/remove containers; Manage volumes; Potential host impact through Docker
- Sensitive access: Docker socket, Container data
- Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
- A project-specific SECURITY.md policy was not available at the fetched official path; the review remains limited to published repository notices.
- No installation, runtime, client matrix, or complete tool-contract audit was performed in this review.
- The fetched official SECURITY.md path returned HTTP 404; it was not treated as positive evidence.
- Docker is not a secure sandbox.
- Project blocks some sensitive options such as --privileged and cap-add/cap-drop.
Original activity observations
- 2026-08-07T06:45:50Z: Migrate to MCP Python SDK v2 ( 56)
Technical identity
github.com/ckreiling/mcp-server-docker- Exact implementation source
- https://github.com/ckreiling/mcp-server-docker ↗
- Reviewed resource type
- MCP Server
- Repository identity
- ckreiling/mcp-server-docker
- Package identity
- pypi:mcp-server-docker
Evidence & Sources
- Evidence basis
- Recorded source evidence
- Setup runtime verification
- Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.
Reviewed · Latest source observation
- GitHub repository ↗
ckreiling/mcp-server-docker
Recorded repository material and project history.
Setup · Watchlist
Install & Agents
Publisher instructions.
Source evidence observed .
Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.
Install / connect
Publisher instructionsPublisher-specific setup path. Follow prerequisites, then register or connect to your MCP host.
publisher documented install or connect · Publisher instructions
uvx mcp-server-dockerConfigure / authenticate
Publisher instructionsRequires Docker daemon and uv. Claude Desktop client config uses stdio `uvx` with args `["mcp-server-docker"]`.
Advanced configuration · generic mcpServers json · Publisher instructions
generic mcpServers json · Publisher instructions
{ "mcpServers": { "mcp-server-docker": { "command": "uvx", "args": [ "mcp-server-docker" ] } } }Check connection
Suggested checkInspect Docker read-only container listing through MCP; do not create/remove containers during verification.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guideRemove `mcp-server-docker` from MCP client config; no global uninstall for uvx. If using container deployment, stop the dedicated MCP container.
MCP100 client-scope guidance: each CLI removal example targets only its named client and exact registered entry. Package names, Desktop/Cursor configuration keys and Codex/Claude registration names may differ; use the entry you actually registered. Client removal does not revoke provider credentials.
claude mcp remove mcp-server-docker
Official Documentation & Sources
What it does
Community Docker MCP for composing, inspecting/debugging containers and managing persistent volumes.
- Capability
- Cloud & DevOps
- Resource type
- MCP Server
- Industry
- Software & Technology
- Best fit
- Managing Docker containers, volumes and remote daemons with natural language
Representative uses
- Create/manage containers
- Inspect/debug containers
- Manage volumes
- Connect to remote Docker over SSH
Limitations
- Docker is not a secure sandbox.
- Project blocks some sensitive options such as --privileged and cap-add/cap-drop.
Reviewed access
Access & risk
Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.
- Authentication
- Docker/SSH environment auth.
- Permissions
- Authority of configured Docker daemon/user.
- Data handling
- Container metadata, logs and volume context are exposed to the client.
- Cost
- free
- Risk and cautions
- Docker daemon access is effectively privileged infrastructure access even with some dangerous flags disabled.
Access scope and cautions
- Write actions
- Create/stop/remove containers Manage volumes Potential host impact through Docker
- Sensitive access
- Docker socket Container data
- Risk level
- high
FAQ
Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-06. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.
Which tasks are documented for this implementation?
What setup and authentication are documented?
Can it modify data or perform write operations?
What data-handling boundary should I consider?
What limitations and risks should I check before use?
Is this an official MCP?
ckreiling is listed as Community implementation in MCP100’s current evidence.