Hostbeam MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Hostbeam access to screenshots delivered over SSH: Does screenshot discovery stay scoped to the beamed files rather than exposing other remote filesystem content?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Let a remote coding agent read screenshots beamed to the server without manually pasting file paths.

What we know

Hostbeam's companion MCP runs on the remote/server machine next to the coding agent and exposes the latest screenshot that the desktop Hostbeam workflow transferred over SSH.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@hostbeam/mcp 0.1.3 published 2026-09-15T00:35:25.620Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: medium.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Read access to beamed screenshot files. Complete write authority is not verified.
Authentication not yet verified.
Sensitive access: Screen contents may contain credentials/private UI/data

Screenshot capture can reveal highly sensitive information even though MCP itself is read-oriented.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Does screenshot discovery stay scoped to the beamed files rather than exposing other remote filesystem content?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Hostbeam access to screenshots delivered over SSH and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Screenshot capture can reveal highly sensitive information even though MCP itself is read-oriented.
Read access to beamed screenshot files.
Screenshots are transferred to the remote server and read locally there by the MCP.
Sensitive access: Screen contents may contain credentials/private UI/data
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
first-party docs
exact tool schema
retention/cleanup policy
Designed around SSH/server file transfer; screenshot files contain whatever is visible on the user's screen.
The exact MCP tool names and file-retention/cleanup behavior were not independently verified from first-party docs in this pass.
Evidence for repository binding is weaker than for most records.

Original activity observations

@hostbeam/mcp 0.1.3 published 2026-09-15T00:35:25.620Z

Technical identity

npm/@hostbeam/mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@hostbeam/mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Package identity: npm:@hostbeam/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry ↗
@hostbeam/mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Official Claude Code and Codex stdio commands; test read-only tool first.
publisher install or stdio launch · Claude Code only · Publisher instructions
claude mcp add -s user hostbeam -- npx -y @hostbeam/mcp
publisher documented install or connection · Codex only · Publisher instructions
codex mcp add hostbeam -- npx -y @hostbeam/mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Use publisher Claude Code registration with `-s user` or Codex registration given in README. Confirm only intended scope and list available tools; avoid state-changing operations during setup.
Check connection
Suggested check
Publisher GitHub README includes a manual stdio JSON-RPC handshake check and MCP registration command; use its read-only handshake, no deployments.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If you added this integration to Claude Code under the registration name `hostbeam`, run `claude mcp remove hostbeam` to unregister that client entry. In Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code or another host, delete/disable the corresponding named MCP registration in that host's settings and restart/reconnect. If you installed an npm package globally or operate a separate HTTP server, uninstall/stop it with its original deployment method. This does not delete user data or revoke service credentials.
MCP client unregister, stopping hosted processes, package uninstall, OAuth disconnect and token revocation are distinct actions.
A claude mcp remove command is only valid for Claude Code when the local registration actually has that name. Other MCP hosts require their own UI/config cleanup.
Separate credential guidance / limitations: No vendor API token required by documented local install; external provider credential revocation not applicable.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove hostbeam

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Hostbeam's companion MCP runs on the remote/server machine next to the coding agent and exposes the latest screenshot that the desktop Hostbeam workflow transferred over SSH.

Capability: Files & Knowledge
Resource type: MCP Server
Best fit: Let a remote coding agent read screenshots beamed to the server without manually pasting file paths.

Representative uses

Read the most recently beamed screenshot
Bridge screenshots from local Mac to remote coding-agent environment

Limitations

Designed around SSH/server file transfer; screenshot files contain whatever is visible on the user's screen.
The exact MCP tool names and file-retention/cleanup behavior were not independently verified from first-party docs in this pass.
Evidence for repository binding is weaker than for most records.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Not documented in the reviewed sources
Permissions: Read access to beamed screenshot files.
Data handling: Screenshots are transferred to the remote server and read locally there by the MCP.
Cost: unknown
Risk and cautions: Screenshot capture can reveal highly sensitive information even though MCP itself is read-oriented.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified
Sensitive access: Screen contents may contain credentials/private UI/data
Risk level: moderate

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Read the most recently beamed screenshot; Bridge screenshots from local Mac to remote coding-agent environment.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. Recorded permission context: Read access to beamed screenshot files.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Screenshots are transferred to the remote server and read locally there by the MCP. Recorded sensitive-access context: Screen contents may contain credentials/private UI/data.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Screenshot capture can reveal highly sensitive information even though MCP itself is read-oriented. Designed around SSH/server file transfer; screenshot files contain whatever is visible on the user's screen. The exact MCP tool names and file-retention/cleanup behavior were not independently verified from first-party docs in this pass. Evidence for repository binding is weaker than for most records. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.