IntoDNS MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to IntoDNS public DNS and email-security diagnostics: Do live scans and citation-ready URLs retain source attribution while the advertised tool catalog expands?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

DNS and email-security diagnostics, record guidance and evidence reports.

What we know

Local/remote MCP exposing IntoDNS domain, email-security, BIMI, sender-requirement, blacklist and evidence/report tools with keyless normal diagnostics.

Maintenance / activity evidence

intodns-mcp 1.10.3 published 2026-09-07T08:02:14.224Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Read/diagnostic against public DNS/reputation data; exact mutation tools were not evidenced. Complete write authority is not verified.
Authentication not yet verified.
Sensitive access: Domain/email infrastructure metadata

Primarily public read diagnostics; do not treat generated DNS records as deployed state.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do live scans and citation-ready URLs retain source attribution while the advertised tool catalog expands?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented IntoDNS public DNS and email-security diagnostics and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Primarily public read diagnostics; do not treat generated DNS records as deployed state.
Read/diagnostic against public DNS/reputation data; exact mutation tools were not evidenced.
Domain names and diagnostic requests are sent to IntoDNS.
Sensitive access: Domain/email infrastructure metadata
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
public repository identity
whether any authenticated write tool exists
Security results depend on live DNS and external reputation sources.
Record-building tools return guidance but do not themselves prove changes were deployed.
Exact public repository binding was not established.

Original activity observations

intodns-mcp 1.10.3 published 2026-09-07T08:02:14.224Z

Technical identity

npm/intodns-mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/intodns-mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Package identity: npm:intodns-mcp
Service endpoint: https://intodns.ai/api/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry metadata ↗
intodns-mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Evidence source ↗
intodns.ai/mcp
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Warning

Not runtime tested, no third-party installation, network authorization, paid calls, or mutation executed.
Do not claim production service is available based on README alone.
Remote and local modes both documented; local stdio npx -y intodns-mcp
Hosted endpoint and local stdio are distinct supported paths, do not use hosted auth behavior to infer local requirements.
Official npm publisher package page README inspected for this exact npm identity; static research only. Some setup statements are conservatively summarized; no source code or live client execution checked. V2 review did not run any live client.
Check actual host syntax and supply credentials in secure client environment; do not paste placeholders verbatim.
Avoid write, payment, token transfer, publishing, sending, booking and remote account changes as tests.
Replace credential, action and registration placeholders; follow the matching publisher/client prerequisites. No execution performed.
Use the matching host, actual registration name and original installation environment; this does not revoke credentials.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Remote and local modes both documented; local stdio npx -y intodns-mcp | Publisher npm README revisited on 2026-10-14; exact identity retained.
Reviewed setup example · Claude Code only · Publisher instructions
claude mcp add --transport http intodns https://intodns.ai/api/mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Hosted HTTP connection; npx stdio and local HTTP also supported.
Check connection
Suggested check
Use read-only `get_health` tool; GET /health for local HTTP only confirms endpoint liveness.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered by the publisher Claude Code example under `intodns`, run the provided unregister command; for a different MCP client or name, delete the actual client registration. Removing a local client entry is distinct from deleting a vendor account/token.
Remove named client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove intodns

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Local/remote MCP exposing IntoDNS domain, email-security, BIMI, sender-requirement, blacklist and evidence/report tools with keyless normal diagnostics.

Capability: Security & Testing
Resource type: MCP Server
Industry: Cybersecurity
Best fit: DNS and email-security diagnostics, record guidance and evidence reports.

Representative uses

Audit DNS records
Check SPF/DKIM/DMARC
Inspect DNSSEC/DANE/BIMI
Check sender requirements/blacklists
Generate recommended records/evidence

Limitations

Security results depend on live DNS and external reputation sources.
Record-building tools return guidance but do not themselves prove changes were deployed.
Exact public repository binding was not established.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Not documented in the reviewed sources
Permissions: Read/diagnostic against public DNS/reputation data; exact mutation tools were not evidenced.
Data handling: Domain names and diagnostic requests are sent to IntoDNS.
Cost: free_normal_diagnostics
Risk and cautions: Primarily public read diagnostics; do not treat generated DNS records as deployed state.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified
Sensitive access: Domain/email infrastructure metadata
Risk level: low

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Audit DNS records; Check SPF/DKIM/DMARC; Inspect DNSSEC/DANE/BIMI; Check sender requirements/blacklists; Generate recommended records/evidence.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y intodns-mcp. Recorded endpoint: https://intodns.ai/api/mcp. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http. Prerequisites: MCP client. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: No auth/signup for normal diagnostic use.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. Recorded permission context: Read/diagnostic against public DNS/reputation data; exact mutation tools were not evidenced.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Domain names and diagnostic requests are sent to IntoDNS. Recorded sensitive-access context: Domain/email infrastructure metadata.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Primarily public read diagnostics; do not treat generated DNS records as deployed state. Security results depend on live DNS and external reputation sources. Record-building tools return guidance but do not themselves prove changes were deployed. Exact public repository binding was not established. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.