Watchlist tracking
Reviewed for relevance and future tracking value.
MCP100 Assessment
Watchlist / Tracking
Why we’re tracking it
Revisit browser-control scope and project disclosures as Playwright and browser security expectations change
Reviewed · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested
Best fit
Automating real browser sessions with pointer, keyboard and persistent-profile control.
What we know
This MCP server drives real browser sessions with pointer and keyboard interaction and can reuse persistent browser profiles. It also offers a standalone local web UI.
Maintenance / activity evidence
- Observed (UTC)0.70.11: the wrapper floor moves to 0.26.0, the firefox-36 engine ( 1…
Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.
Verification gaps / watch-outs
- Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
- Controls a browser and can interact with authenticated pages. Writes: Click, type, submit forms and perform browser-side actions.
- Standalone UI can use an OpenRouter API key; MCP-side auth is not documented.
- Sensitive access: Browser session cookies, Authenticated web accounts
- Browser automation can act inside authenticated sessions; the project also warns about exposing an unauthenticated UI when rebinding the host.
- Avoid putting API keys directly on command lines where they may enter shell history or process listings.
Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.
Popularity
31,778 repository stars · 8.8k package downloads / 30 days
Stars observed Oct 6, 2026. Downloads observed Oct 6, 2026.
All limitations / Review context
What browser actions, authentication boundaries, and disclosure guidance are current at the next review?
The bounded official-source review found no disclosed material public-tracking blocker for the documented browser automation MCP; browser-control scope remains a stated uncertainty and was not treated as a safety certification.
- Browser automation can act inside authenticated sessions; the project also warns about exposing an unauthenticated UI when rebinding the host.
- Avoid putting API keys directly on command lines where they may enter shell history or process listings.
- Controls a browser and can interact with authenticated pages.
- Standalone UI can use an OpenRouter API key; MCP-side auth is not documented.
- Browser pages, profiles and cookies may be processed locally.
- Reviewed write actions: Click, type, submit forms and perform browser-side actions
- Sensitive access: Browser session cookies, Authenticated web accounts
- Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
- Browser automation can have consequential effects; no independent runtime or permission audit was performed, and no project-specific SECURITY.md policy was available at the fetched path.
- A project-specific SECURITY.md policy was not available at the fetched official path; the review remains limited to published repository notices.
- No installation, runtime, client matrix, or complete tool-contract audit was performed in this review.
- The fetched official SECURITY.md path returned HTTP 404; it was not treated as positive evidence.
- Persistent browser profiles can contain authenticated cookies.
- Exposing the UI beyond loopback can create an unauthenticated surface if not separately protected.
Original activity observations
- 2026-10-05T17:07:01Z: 0.70.11: the wrapper floor moves to 0.26.0, the firefox-36 engine ( 1…
Technical identity
github.com/feder-cr/invisible_playwright_mcp- Exact implementation source
- https://github.com/feder-cr/invisible_playwright_mcp ↗
- Reviewed resource type
- MCP Server
- Repository identity
- feder-cr/invisible_playwright_mcp
- Package identity
- pypi:invisible-playwright-mcp
Evidence & Sources
- Evidence basis
- Recorded source evidence
- Setup runtime verification
- Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.
Reviewed · Latest source observation
- GitHub repository ↗
feder-cr/invisible_playwright_mcp
Recorded repository material and project history.
- Evidence source ↗
pypi.org/project/invisible-playwright-mcp/
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Setup · Watchlist
Install & Agents
Claude Code
Publisher instructions with a documented client setup path.
Source evidence observed .
Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.
Install / connect
Publisher instructionsPublisher-specific setup path. Follow prerequisites, then register or connect to your MCP host.
publisher documented install or connect · Publisher instructions
uvx invisible-playwright-mcpConfigure / authenticate
Publisher instructionsInstall uv before using uvx; the publisher documents client plugins and file-based stdio configs.
Check connection
Suggested checkStart a new MCP session and discover browser tools; first browser launch may download the engine.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guideRemove client plugin/extension or corresponding MCP config; close local Firefox engine if running.
MCP100 client-scope guidance: each CLI removal example targets only its named client and exact registered entry. Package names, Desktop/Cursor configuration keys and Codex/Claude registration names may differ; use the entry you actually registered. Client removal does not revoke provider credentials.
claude mcp remove invisible-playwright-mcp
What it does
This MCP server drives real browser sessions with pointer and keyboard interaction and can reuse persistent browser profiles. It also offers a standalone local web UI.
- Capability
- Browser Automation
- Resource type
- MCP Server
- Best fit
- Automating real browser sessions with pointer, keyboard and persistent-profile control.
Representative uses
- Automate forms and web applications
- Reuse authenticated browser profiles
- Run interactive browser tasks
- Use optional proxy routing
Limitations
- Persistent browser profiles can contain authenticated cookies.
- Exposing the UI beyond loopback can create an unauthenticated surface if not separately protected.
Reviewed access
Access & risk
Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.
- Authentication
- Standalone UI can use an OpenRouter API key; MCP-side auth is not documented.
- Permissions
- Controls a browser and can interact with authenticated pages.
- Data handling
- Browser pages, profiles and cookies may be processed locally.
- Cost
- usage_based
- Risk and cautions
- Browser automation can act inside authenticated sessions; the project also warns about exposing an unauthenticated UI when rebinding the host.
Access scope and cautions
- Write actions
- Click, type, submit forms and perform browser-side actions
- Sensitive access
- Browser session cookies Authenticated web accounts
- Risk level
- high
- Security notes
- Avoid putting API keys directly on command lines where they may enter shell history or process listings.
FAQ
Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-06. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.
Which tasks are documented for this implementation?
What setup and authentication are documented?
Can it modify data or perform write operations?
What data-handling boundary should I consider?
What limitations and risks should I check before use?
What cost model is recorded?
Is this an official MCP?
feder-cr is listed as Community implementation in MCP100’s current evidence.