JustDrop MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to JustDrop ephemeral encrypted file handoff: Do room closure and destination pairing retain explicit limits without turning encryption claims into certification?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Ephemeral end-to-end-encrypted file handoff between an agent machine and a browser/device.

What we know

Local MCP for sending/receiving files via one-to-one expiring rooms. Files are encrypted before relay and decrypted only at endpoints; the server includes a root jail, credential-file refusal and explicit file manifests.

Maintenance / activity evidence

justdrop-mcp 0.1.6 published 2026-07-20T10:34:04.885Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Local filesystem send/receive authority bounded by JUSTDROP_ROOT. Writes: Read/send allowed local files; Receive/write files under root; Destroy rooms.
Authentication not yet verified.
Sensitive access: Local files, Received files, Room code

File exfiltration/injection risk remains despite encryption; root jail and credential refusal are important.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do room closure and destination pairing retain explicit limits without turning encryption claims into certification?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented JustDrop ephemeral encrypted file handoff and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

File exfiltration/injection risk remains despite encryption; root jail and credential refusal are important.
Local filesystem send/receive authority bounded by JUSTDROP_ROOT.
Files are AES-GCM encrypted and relayed as ciphertext; service says relay never sees plaintext/keys.
Reviewed write actions: Read/send allowed local files; Receive/write files under root; Destroy rooms
Sensitive access: Local files, Received files, Room code
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
Reads/writes local files inside configured root.
Room codes are sensitive bearer-like rendezvous identifiers.
Files are encrypted in memory and very large files can require substantial RAM.
Hard file-size and extension restrictions apply.

Original activity observations

justdrop-mcp 0.1.6 published 2026-07-20T10:34:04.885Z

Technical identity

npm/justdrop-mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/justdrop-mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Repository identity: Managed-Digital-LLC/justdrop-mcp
Package identity: npm:justdrop-mcp
Service endpoint: https://justdrop.ai

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry ↗
justdrop-mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher-documented package/connection route; replace placeholders and verify host-specific syntax.
Publisher setup example · Claude Code only · Publisher instructions
claude mcp add justdrop -- npx -y justdrop-mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Requires Node.js 20+; use JUSTDROP_ROOT to confine transfers to approved directory. No user account for ephemeral rooms.
Use correct transport and published host config. Never paste secrets in chat; server registration is separate from software installation.
Environment settings: JUSTDROP_ROOT, JUSTDROP_BASE_URL (optional), JUSTDROP_DEFAULT_EXPIRY_MINUTES (optional)
Check connection
Suggested check
Confirm JustDrop tools and inspect room/status without transferring a real file.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered as `justdrop-mcp` in Claude Code, remove its exact client entry with `claude mcp remove justdrop-mcp`; for Cursor/Claude Desktop/Codex, remove the matching MCP entry in that host settings. This client removal is MCP100-composed, not a vendor uninstall instruction. Npx does not imply a global install; do not delete user data or revoke credentials implicitly.
Publisher install example registration name(s): justdrop. The supplied removal example applies only to an existing Claude Code registration named justdrop-mcp; it does not remove the differently named install example. Confirm the actual host entry before use.
Conditional host / package cleanup · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide · Review before use
```
claude mcp remove justdrop-mcp
```

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Local MCP for sending/receiving files via one-to-one expiring rooms. Files are encrypted before relay and decrypted only at endpoints; the server includes a root jail, credential-file refusal and explicit file manifests.

Capability: Files & Knowledge
Resource type: MCP Server
Best fit: Ephemeral end-to-end-encrypted file handoff between an agent machine and a browser/device.

Representative uses

Drop files/folders to phone/browser
Receive files from another device into working directory
Watch transfer status
Cancel/destroy session

Limitations

Reads/writes local files inside configured root.
Room codes are sensitive bearer-like rendezvous identifiers.
Files are encrypted in memory and very large files can require substantial RAM.
Hard file-size and extension restrictions apply.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Not documented in the reviewed sources
Permissions: Local filesystem send/receive authority bounded by JUSTDROP_ROOT.
Data handling: Files are AES-GCM encrypted and relayed as ciphertext; service says relay never sees plaintext/keys.
Cost: free
Risk and cautions: File exfiltration/injection risk remains despite encryption; root jail and credential refusal are important.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Read/send allowed local files Receive/write files under root Destroy rooms
Sensitive access: Local files Received files Room code
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Drop files/folders to phone/browser; Receive files from another device into working directory; Watch transfer status; Cancel/destroy session.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y justdrop-mcp. Recorded endpoint: https://justdrop.ai. Recorded transport: stdio. Recorded environment-variable notes: JUSTDROP_ROOT; JUSTDROP_BASE_URL (optional); JUSTDROP_DEFAULT_EXPIRY_MINUTES (optional). No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Node.js 20+; browser/device recipient. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: No user account required for normal room transfer.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Read/send allowed local files; Receive/write files under root; Destroy rooms. Recorded permission boundary: Local filesystem send/receive authority bounded by JUSTDROP_ROOT.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Files are AES-GCM encrypted and relayed as ciphertext; service says relay never sees plaintext/keys. Recorded sensitive-access context: Local files; Received files; Room code.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

File exfiltration/injection risk remains despite encryption; root jail and credential refusal are important. Reads/writes local files inside configured root. Room codes are sensitive bearer-like rendezvous identifiers. Files are encrypted in memory and very large files can require substantial RAM. Hard file-size and extension restrictions apply. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.