Matih MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Matih SQL, analytics and dashboard operations: Do OAuth/PKCE and PII egress controls remain explicit before query outputs and uploaded files leave the platform?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Query governed business data and create Matih analytical artifacts with scoped OAuth/bearer authentication.

What we know

The grounded data layer for any LLM: governed SQL, metrics, lineage and catalog over your data. This profile is based on verified official documentation where listed; unresolved operational details are explicitly marked.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@matihlabs/mcp 0.2.1 published 2026-07-06T18:39:35.298Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: medium.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Scoped tenant SQL, analysis, upload and publishing authority Reported action classes: Create dashboards/charts; Publish dashboards; Upload files and finalize uploads; Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool). Complete write authority is not verified.
Matih scoped developer bearer token; remote OAuth/PKCE supported for compatible clients
Sensitive access: Enterprise data, Potential PII, Developer token, Uploaded files

Potential high-impact side effects: Create dashboards/charts, Publish dashboards, Upload files and finalize uploads, Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool).

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do OAuth/PKCE and PII egress controls remain explicit before query outputs and uploaded files leave the platform?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Matih SQL, analytics and dashboard operations and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Potential high-impact side effects: Create dashboards/charts, Publish dashboards, Upload files and finalize uploads, Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool).
Scoped tenant SQL, analysis, upload and publishing authority
Matih scoped developer bearer token; remote OAuth/PKCE supported for compatible clients
Queries, selected data, upload content and metadata cross to tenant Matih remote service; third-party LLM egress requires tenant consent.
Reviewed write actions: Create dashboards/charts; Publish dashboards; Upload files and finalize uploads; Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool)
Sensitive access: Enterprise data, Potential PII, Developer token, Uploaded files
Complete write authority is not verified.
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
cost: plans, pay-per-call charges, and payment authorization details
SQL mutation scope by tenant/token
The npm package can bridge local stdio to tenant remote HTTP, not an isolated local database
Token permissions and egress consent bound the tool surface
Tenant endpoint contains a workspace slug and cannot be guessed
The local npm process is a bridge to the workspace remote MCP; SQL write authority must be evaluated against token scopes.

Original activity observations

@matihlabs/mcp 0.2.1 published 2026-07-06T18:39:35.298Z

Technical identity

npm/@matihlabs/mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@matihlabs/mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: Gateway
Repository identity: matih-labs/matih-mcp
Package identity: npm:@matihlabs/mcp
Service endpoint: https://<slug>.app.matih.ai/api/v1/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry ↗
@matihlabs/mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
GitHub repository ↗
matih-labs/matih-mcp
Repository reference; implementation attribution is not established for every document.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Gateway setup

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Local stdio requires MATIH_MCP_TOKEN; custom OAuth PKCE client integration is programmatic and not interchangeable with stdio.
publisher install or stdio launch · Publisher instructions
npx -y @matihlabs/mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Configure npx @matihlabs/mcp as stdio with MATIH_MCP_TOKEN. OAuth PKCE is documented for programmatic McpClient with token provider; not interchangeable with static token env.
claude desktop or cursor mcpServers json · MCP100 composed guide
{ "mcpServers": { "matih": { "args": [ "-y", "@matihlabs/mcp" ], "command": "npx", "env": { "MATIH_MCP_TOKEN": "REPLACE_BEARER" } } } }
Check connection
Suggested check
After supplying MATIH_MCP_TOKEN, inspect authorized read-only tools and retrieve account metadata; do not upload files.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If you added this integration to Claude Code under the registration name `matihlabs`, run `claude mcp remove matihlabs` to unregister that client entry. In Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code or another host, delete/disable the corresponding named MCP registration in that host's settings and restart/reconnect. If you installed an npm package globally or operate a separate HTTP server, uninstall/stop it with its original deployment method. This does not delete user data or revoke service credentials.
MCP client unregister, stopping hosted processes, package uninstall, OAuth disconnect and token revocation are distinct actions.
A claude mcp remove command is only valid for Claude Code when the local registration actually has that name. Other MCP hosts require their own UI/config cleanup.
Separate credential guidance / limitations: Matih: Settings → Developer Tokens issues mat_agt_ scoped bearer tokens. SDK supports OAuthTokenProvider separately. README does not specify revoke/delete click path, so show issuer token-management location without invented action.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove matihlabs

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

The grounded data layer for any LLM: governed SQL, metrics, lineage and catalog over your data. This profile is based on verified official documentation where listed; unresolved operational details are explicitly marked.

Capability: Data & Databases
Resource type: Gateway
Best fit: Query governed business data and create Matih analytical artifacts with scoped OAuth/bearer authentication.

Representative uses

Run governed SQL and table profiles
Inspect metrics, taxonomy and lineage
Create/publish dashboards and charts
Create/finalize file uploads

Limitations

The npm package can bridge local stdio to tenant remote HTTP, not an isolated local database
Token permissions and egress consent bound the tool surface
Tenant endpoint contains a workspace slug and cannot be guessed
The local npm process is a bridge to the workspace remote MCP; SQL write authority must be evaluated against token scopes.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Matih scoped developer bearer token; remote OAuth/PKCE supported for compatible clients
Permissions: Scoped tenant SQL, analysis, upload and publishing authority
Data handling: Queries, selected data, upload content and metadata cross to tenant Matih remote service; third-party LLM egress requires tenant consent.
Cost: Not documented in the reviewed sources
Risk and cautions: Potential high-impact side effects: Create dashboards/charts, Publish dashboards, Upload files and finalize uploads, Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool).

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Not verified Create dashboards/charts Publish dashboards Upload files and finalize uploads Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool)
Sensitive access: Enterprise data Potential PII Developer token Uploaded files
Risk level: high

The reviewed evidence does not establish the complete write authority of this MCP. Consult the unresolved evidence before granting write access.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Run governed SQL and table profiles; Inspect metrics, taxonomy and lineage; Create/publish dashboards and charts; Create/finalize file uploads.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y @matihlabs/mcp https://<slug>.app.matih.ai/api/v1/mcp. Recorded transport: stdio_proxy, streamable_http_remote. Recorded environment-variable notes: MATIH_MCP_TOKEN. No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: MCP-capable client. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Matih scoped developer bearer token; remote OAuth/PKCE supported for compatible clients

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Not verified. The available evidence does not establish the complete write authority. The partial inventory lists: Create dashboards/charts; Publish dashboards; Upload files and finalize uploads; Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool). Recorded permission context: Scoped tenant SQL, analysis, upload and publishing authority

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Queries, selected data, upload content and metadata cross to tenant Matih remote service; third-party LLM egress requires tenant consent. Recorded sensitive-access context: Enterprise data; Potential PII; Developer token; Uploaded files.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Potential high-impact side effects: Create dashboards/charts, Publish dashboards, Upload files and finalize uploads, Run SQL (read/write DB scope must be confirmed per token and tool). The npm package can bridge local stdio to tenant remote HTTP, not an isolated local database. Token permissions and egress consent bound the tool surface. Tenant endpoint contains a workspace slug and cannot be guessed. The local npm process is a bridge to the workspace remote MCP; SQL write authority must be evaluated against token scopes. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.