Watchlist tracking
Reviewed for relevance and future tracking value.
MCP100 Assessment
Watchlist / Tracking
Why we’re tracking it
Follow PostgreSQL, gateway, and MCP exposure changes as the server evolves
Reviewed · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested
Best fit
Exposing PostgreSQL or TimescaleDB data through a self-hosted HTTP API.
What we know
pREST is a self-hosted data API for PostgreSQL and TimescaleDB. The reviewed repository clearly documents the HTTP data API, but does not clearly establish an MCP-specific server surface.
Maintenance / activity evidence
- Observed (UTC)Mysql ( 1048)
Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: medium.
Verification gaps / watch-outs
- Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
- Reflects the database/API credentials configured for pREST. Writes: Potential database writes depending on API configuration.
- Deployment-specific.
- Sensitive access: Database credentials, Database records
- The underlying data API can expose or change database contents; the MCP-specific boundary is unresolved and should not be inferred.
Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.
Popularity
4,621 repository stars
Stars observed Oct 6, 2026.
All limitations / Review context
Does pREST still document the same MCP gateway path and PostgreSQL capabilities?
The bounded assessment reviewed the official README, repository notices, security policy path, and security page for known material public-tracking blockers. No such blocker was identified. This is a public-tracking assessment, not an installation safety certification.
- The underlying data API can expose or change database contents; the MCP-specific boundary is unresolved and should not be inferred.
- Reflects the database/API credentials configured for pREST.
- Deployment-specific.
- Database data is exposed through the self-hosted API.
- Reviewed write actions: Potential database writes depending on API configuration
- Sensitive access: Database credentials, Database records
- Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
- A project-specific SECURITY.md policy was not available at the fetched official path; the review remains limited to published repository notices.
- No installation, runtime, client matrix, or complete tool-contract audit was performed in this review.
- The fetched official SECURITY.md path returned HTTP 404; it was not treated as positive evidence.
- MCP-specific interface identity
- MCP transport/setup
- Resource classification remains unresolved.
- MCP-specific identity and transport are not established in the reviewed repository.
- Do not invent MCP setup from the HTTP API setup.
Original activity observations
- 2026-10-05T16:54:01Z: Mysql ( 1048)
Technical identity
github.com/prest/prest- Exact implementation source
- https://github.com/prest/prest ↗
- Reviewed resource type
- Gateway
- Repository identity
- prest/prest
Evidence & Sources
- Evidence basis
- Recorded source evidence
- Setup runtime verification
- Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.
Reviewed · Latest source observation
- GitHub repository ↗
prest/prest
Recorded repository material and project history.
Setup · Watchlist
Self-hosted gateway service setup
Publisher instructions.
Source evidence observed .
Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.
Install / connect
Publisher instructionspREST is a Postgres REST API gateway with a read-only MCP endpoint `/_mcp` (v2.1+). Install supported v2 and enable the MCP expose/auth policies.
publisher documented · Publisher instructions
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 -e PREST_PG_URL=postgres://USER:PASSWORD@POSTGRES_HOST:5432/DB prest/prest:v2.4.2Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guideConfigure PREST_PG_URL, credentials and ACL. pREST v2.1+ publishes read-only MCP HTTP at http://localhost:3000/_mcp; expose only permitted tables according to publisher `[expose]` policies. For stdio-only clients install pREST MCP adapter using `brew install prest/tap/prest-mcp`, or follow official AI/MCP documentation.
Check connection
Suggested checkVerify pREST database connectivity and that MCP client can initialize its http://localhost:3000/_mcp endpoint and list allowed read-only tables/tools, not only that REST GET responds.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guideDisconnect MCP client from the pREST `/_mcp` endpoint or remove its stdio adapter. Stop the Docker container by its exact ID/name with `docker stop <PREST_CONTAINER_ID>`; remove only that stopped container with `docker rm <PREST_CONTAINER_ID>` if desired. Stop pREST before package uninstall; keep Postgres storage.
Client unregistration, program uninstall, persistent-data deletion, and credential revocation must be treated separately.
Stop deployment / service · MCP100 composed guide
docker stop <PREST_CONTAINER_ID>
What it does
pREST is a self-hosted data API for PostgreSQL and TimescaleDB. The reviewed repository clearly documents the HTTP data API, but does not clearly establish an MCP-specific server surface.
- Capability
- Data & Databases
- Industry
- Software & Technology
- Best fit
- Exposing PostgreSQL or TimescaleDB data through a self-hosted HTTP API.
Representative uses
- Expose PostgreSQL data over HTTP
- Run query scripts
- Deploy with Docker Compose
- Serve TimescaleDB-backed APIs
Limitations
- MCP-specific identity and transport are not established in the reviewed repository.
- Do not invent MCP setup from the HTTP API setup.
Reviewed access
Access & risk
Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.
- Authentication
- Deployment-specific.
- Permissions
- Reflects the database/API credentials configured for pREST.
- Data handling
- Database data is exposed through the self-hosted API.
- Cost
- free
- Risk and cautions
- The underlying data API can expose or change database contents; the MCP-specific boundary is unresolved and should not be inferred.
Access scope and cautions
- Write actions
- Potential database writes depending on API configuration
- Sensitive access
- Database credentials Database records
- Risk level
- high
FAQ
Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-06. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.
Which tasks are documented for this implementation?
What authentication is documented?
Can it modify data or perform write operations?
What data-handling boundary should I consider?
What limitations and risks should I check before use?
Is this an official MCP?
pREST is listed as First-party MCP in MCP100’s current evidence.