PullPush MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to PullPush integration planning and API synchronization: Do shadow previews and reconciliation still precede live writes across connected systems?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Build, preview, run and monitor data integrations with shadow-mode and preview-before-write safety controls.

What we know

Official MCP for PullPush integration runtime. It manages connections, flows, sync/reconciliation, field mapping, diagnostics and connector authoring. New flows start in read-only shadow mode until explicitly cut over.

Maintenance / activity evidence

kaduno-pullpush-mcp 2.3.0 published 2026-09-30T15:07:16.559Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Potential read/write integration authority across connected source/destination systems. Writes: Create connections/flows; Cut over from shadow to live; Write synchronized records; Run reconciliation.
Tenant/org/admin key.
Sensitive access: Connected-system credentials, Business/customer/order/inventory data

Integration runtime can modify external systems; shadow mode and preview-before-write are critical controls.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do shadow previews and reconciliation still precede live writes across connected systems?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented PullPush integration planning and API synchronization and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Integration runtime can modify external systems; shadow mode and preview-before-write are critical controls.
Potential read/write integration authority across connected source/destination systems.
Tenant/org/admin key.
Connection secrets are envelope-encrypted server-side and represented by references; synced business records transit PullPush.
Reviewed write actions: Create connections/flows; Cut over from shadow to live; Write synchronized records; Run reconciliation
Sensitive access: Connected-system credentials, Business/customer/order/inventory data
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
Tenant/org/admin keys have very different authority.
Live cutover can mutate destination systems.
AI may help with mapping/build-time tasks, but the sync engine itself is deterministic.
Credentials are server-side and hidden from tool results.

Original activity observations

kaduno-pullpush-mcp 2.3.0 published 2026-09-30T15:07:16.559Z

Technical identity

npm/kaduno-pullpush-mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/kaduno-pullpush-mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: Gateway
Repository identity: Kaduno-systems/pullpush-mcp
Package identity: npm:kaduno-pullpush-mcp
Service endpoint: https://api.pullpush.ai/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry metadata ↗
kaduno-pullpush-mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Evidence source ↗
pullpush.ai/docs/mcp
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
pullpush.ai/
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
pullpush.ai/changelog
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Gateway setup

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / configure gateway or CLI
Publisher instructions
Publisher-documented package/connection route; replace placeholders and verify host-specific syntax.
Publisher setup example · Publisher instructions
npm i -g kaduno-pullpush-mcp@2.3.0
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Register installed stdio binary in MCP client and set PULLPUSH_API_KEY. Publisher recommends a pinned global install, explicitly not npx @latest.
Use correct transport and published host config. Never paste secrets in chat; server registration is separate from software installation.
Environment settings: PULLPUSH_API_KEY
Previously reviewed route-specific authentication / prerequisites: Tenant/org/admin API key; ChatGPT remote path can use OAuth.
Check connection
Suggested check
Run publisher tool pullpush.connection.test or pullpush.health.mcp for the configured tenant.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered as `kaduno-pullpush-mcp` in Claude Code, remove its exact client entry with `claude mcp remove kaduno-pullpush-mcp`; for Cursor/Claude Desktop/Codex, remove the matching MCP entry in that host settings. This client removal is MCP100-composed, not a vendor uninstall instruction. Npx does not imply a global install; do not delete user data or revoke credentials implicitly. For an explicitly globally installed package (not npx-only), npm uninstall -g kaduno-pullpush-mcp.
Conditional host / package cleanup · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove kaduno-pullpush-mcp

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Official MCP for PullPush integration runtime. It manages connections, flows, sync/reconciliation, field mapping, diagnostics and connector authoring. New flows start in read-only shadow mode until explicitly cut over.

Capability: Data & Databases
Resource type: Gateway
Best fit: Build, preview, run and monitor data integrations with shadow-mode and preview-before-write safety controls.

Representative uses

Create/test connections
Build source→destination flows
Preview canonical diffs before writing
Cut over/run sync
Diagnose/reconcile integrations
Author connectors

Limitations

Tenant/org/admin keys have very different authority.
Live cutover can mutate destination systems.
AI may help with mapping/build-time tasks, but the sync engine itself is deterministic.
Credentials are server-side and hidden from tool results.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Tenant/org/admin key.
Permissions: Potential read/write integration authority across connected source/destination systems.
Data handling: Connection secrets are envelope-encrypted server-side and represented by references; synced business records transit PullPush.
Cost: plan_based
Risk and cautions: Integration runtime can modify external systems; shadow mode and preview-before-write are critical controls.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Create connections/flows Cut over from shadow to live Write synchronized records Run reconciliation
Sensitive access: Connected-system credentials Business/customer/order/inventory data
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Create/test connections; Build source→destination flows; Preview canonical diffs before writing; Cut over/run sync; Diagnose/reconcile integrations; Author connectors.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y kaduno-pullpush-mcp@latest. Recorded endpoint: https://api.pullpush.ai/mcp. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http. Recorded environment-variable notes: PULLPUSH_API_KEY. No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: PullPush tenant/account. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Tenant/org/admin API key; ChatGPT remote path can use OAuth.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Create connections/flows; Cut over from shadow to live; Write synchronized records; Run reconciliation. Recorded permission boundary: Potential read/write integration authority across connected source/destination systems.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Connection secrets are envelope-encrypted server-side and represented by references; synced business records transit PullPush. Recorded sensitive-access context: Connected-system credentials; Business/customer/order/inventory data.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Integration runtime can modify external systems; shadow mode and preview-before-write are critical controls. Tenant/org/admin keys have very different authority. Live cutover can mutate destination systems. AI may help with mapping/build-time tasks, but the sync engine itself is deterministic. Credentials are server-side and hidden from tool results. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.

What cost model is recorded?

The reviewed cost model is plan based. This classification does not establish current prices, quotas or the cost of every downstream operation. Check the applicable service terms before authorizing paid actions.