SAP MCP Server — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to OOBE SAP identity, tool and settlement operations via typed MCP tools: Do signing modes and monetized hosted workflows retain explicit authorization as stdio and HTTP surfaces evolve?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Non-custodial Solana agent-commerce and paid-tool workflows with local signing.

What we know

Solana-native MCP runtime for agent registration/discovery, tool metadata, balances, transaction building, x402/pay.sh payments and optional value-moving workflows while keeping signing local when configured.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server 0.9.86 published 2026-09-20T19:18:24.946Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Read tools, registry writes, transaction building/finalization and payment/value authority. Writes: Register/update on-chain agent metadata; Publish tool/profile state; Sign/submit Solana/SPL transactions; Execute x402 payments; Run value-moving workflows.
Deployment auth plus local wallet/external-signer authorization.
Sensitive access: Wallet/signing capability, Financial assets, Payment intents, Agent identity

Financial/on-chain action surface; strict approval, limits and dedicated signing wallets are necessary.
Keep keypair bytes local.
Use dedicated wallets, readonly modes, previews, allowlists and bounded payment limits.
Value-moving operations can be irreversible.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do signing modes and monetized hosted workflows retain explicit authorization as stdio and HTTP surfaces evolve?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented OOBE SAP identity, tool and settlement operations via typed MCP tools and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Financial/on-chain action surface; strict approval, limits and dedicated signing wallets are necessary.
Keep keypair bytes local.
Use dedicated wallets, readonly modes, previews, allowlists and bounded payment limits.
Read tools, registry writes, transaction building/finalization and payment/value authority.
Deployment auth plus local wallet/external-signer authorization.
Hosted requests/payment verification occur remotely while signing keys remain local when configured as documented.
Reviewed write actions: Register/update on-chain agent metadata; Publish tool/profile state; Sign/submit Solana/SPL transactions; Execute x402 payments; Run value-moving workflows
Sensitive access: Wallet/signing capability, Financial assets, Payment intents, Agent identity
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
live tool catalog
deployment-specific auth/policy
per-tool dynamic pricing
Value-moving operations can be irreversible.
Hosted paid/write calls require local/external signing or supported wallet flow.
Production deployments require strict signer/policy/secret configuration.
Tool registry/pricing are dynamic.

Original activity observations

@oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server 0.9.86 published 2026-09-20T19:18:24.946Z

Technical identity

npm/@oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server ↗
Reviewed resource type: Gateway
Repository identity: OOBE-PROTOCOL/sap-mcp
Package identity: npm:@oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server
Service endpoint: https://mcp.sap.oobeprotocol.ai/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry ↗
@oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
GitHub repository ↗
oobe-protocol/sap-mcp
Repository reference; implementation attribution is not established for every document.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Gateway setup

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher global binary `sap-mcp-server`; source deploys require pnpm, do not recommend npm install for source.
publisher documented install or connect · Publisher instructions
npm install -g @oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server
publisher documented install or connect · Publisher instructions
npx sap-mcp-config wizard
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
For source installs publisher mandates pnpm; do not substitute npm install. Published binary also supports npm global install and sap-mcp-config wizard.
Check connection
Suggested check
After SAP setup wizard completes, run publisher `npx sap-mcp-config show` (avoid disclosing secrets) and inspect MCP tools without invoking SAP mutations.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If you added this integration to Claude Code under the registration name `sap-mcp`, run `claude mcp remove sap-mcp` to unregister that client entry. In Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code or another host, delete/disable the corresponding named MCP registration in that host's settings and restart/reconnect. If you installed an npm package globally or operate a separate HTTP server, uninstall/stop it with its original deployment method. This does not delete user data or revoke service credentials.
MCP client unregister, stopping hosted processes, package uninstall, OAuth disconnect and token revocation are distinct actions.
A claude mcp remove command is only valid for Claude Code when the local registration actually has that name. Other MCP hosts require their own UI/config cleanup.
Separate credential guidance / limitations: SAP MCP can be run with SAP_MCP_AUTH_TYPE=none (public deployments under guardrails), api-key, or JWT (private). Keys/JWT belong to the operator of the hosted/self-hosted gateway; revoke using that deployment issuer, not via arbitrary npm uninstall.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove sap-mcp

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Solana-native MCP runtime for agent registration/discovery, tool metadata, balances, transaction building, x402/pay.sh payments and optional value-moving workflows while keeping signing local when configured.

Capability: Finance & Payments
Resource type: Gateway
Industry: Financial Services & Investing
Best fit: Non-custodial Solana agent-commerce and paid-tool workflows with local signing.

Representative uses

Register/update agent identities
Discover agents/services
Inspect balances/market data
Make paid hosted MCP calls
Build/finalize/submit Solana transactions through local signer

Limitations

Value-moving operations can be irreversible.
Hosted paid/write calls require local/external signing or supported wallet flow.
Production deployments require strict signer/policy/secret configuration.
Tool registry/pricing are dynamic.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Deployment auth plus local wallet/external-signer authorization.
Permissions: Read tools, registry writes, transaction building/finalization and payment/value authority.
Data handling: Hosted requests/payment verification occur remotely while signing keys remain local when configured as documented.
Cost: usage_based
Risk and cautions: Financial/on-chain action surface; strict approval, limits and dedicated signing wallets are necessary.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Register/update on-chain agent metadata Publish tool/profile state Sign/submit Solana/SPL transactions Execute x402 payments Run value-moving workflows
Sensitive access: Wallet/signing capability Financial assets Payment intents Agent identity
Risk level: high
Security notes: Keep keypair bytes local. Use dedicated wallets, readonly modes, previews, allowlists and bounded payment limits.

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Register/update agent identities; Discover agents/services; Inspect balances/market data; Make paid hosted MCP calls; Build/finalize/submit Solana transactions through local signer.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y @oobe-protocol-labs/sap-mcp-server. Recorded endpoint: https://mcp.sap.oobeprotocol.ai/mcp. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http. Recorded environment-variable notes: SAP_MCP_AUTH_TYPE (deployment dependent); SAP_MCP_MONETIZATION_ENABLED (optional); SAP_MCP_RUNTIME_ID; SAP_SIGNING_AUTH_TOKEN / external signer vars as applicable. No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Node/npm; MCP client; wallet/signer for writes/payments; SOL/USDC as needed. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Hosted deployment auth can be API key/JWT/bearerless-with-policy; local wallet/external signer authorizes payment/value actions.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Register/update on-chain agent metadata; Publish tool/profile state; Sign/submit Solana/SPL transactions; Execute x402 payments; Run value-moving workflows. Recorded permission boundary: Read tools, registry writes, transaction building/finalization and payment/value authority.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Hosted requests/payment verification occur remotely while signing keys remain local when configured as documented. Recorded sensitive-access context: Wallet/signing capability; Financial assets; Payment intents; Agent identity.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Financial/on-chain action surface; strict approval, limits and dedicated signing wallets are necessary. Value-moving operations can be irreversible. Hosted paid/write calls require local/external signing or supported wallet flow. Production deployments require strict signer/policy/secret configuration. Tool registry/pricing are dynamic. Keep keypair bytes local. Use dedicated wallets, readonly modes, previews, allowlists and bounded payment limits. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.

Is this an official MCP?

OOBE Protocol is listed as First-party MCP in MCP100’s current evidence.