Soma — Watchlist | MCP100 Index

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Soma Rust agent runtime with HTTP MCP and plugin surfaces: Do runtime plugins preserve the same authentication and typed contracts across CLI, REST and MCP?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Runtime/scaffold for provider-backed Rust MCP products with shared auth, CLI/REST/HTTP MCP, plugins and generated contracts.

What we know

Soma is a batteries-included RMCP runtime and scaffold rather than a single narrow service connector. Provider manifests or static Rust providers define business actions; Soma projects them across MCP/CLI/REST with validation/auth/observability and scaffold/export tooling.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@dinglebear/soma 0.10.0 published 2026-08-05T18:13:46.198Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Whatever authority loaded providers declare; destructive actions can be gated by runtime policy. Writes: Provider-defined writes; Scaffold/export local project state.
Provider/runtime dependent.
Sensitive access: Provider credentials, Potential local/remote service data

Framework can host high-authority providers; risk is configuration/provider-specific.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do runtime plugins preserve the same authentication and typed contracts across CLI, REST and MCP?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Soma Rust agent runtime with HTTP MCP and plugin surfaces and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Framework can host high-authority providers; risk is configuration/provider-specific.
Whatever authority loaded providers declare; destructive actions can be gated by runtime policy.
Provider/runtime dependent.
Local/runtime provider data handling varies by provider; Soma supplies shared auth/validation but does not replace upstream authorization.
Reviewed write actions: Provider-defined writes; Scaffold/export local project state
Sensitive access: Provider credentials, Potential local/remote service data
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
Actual data/write authority depends entirely on loaded providers.
Not intended as a public multi-tenant security boundary by itself.
Npm package is a launcher for verified native binary.
Single MCP tool dispatch hides a dynamic action catalog behind `action`.

Original activity observations

@dinglebear/soma 0.10.0 published 2026-08-05T18:13:46.198Z

Technical identity

npm/@dinglebear/soma

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@dinglebear/soma ↗
Reviewed resource type: Framework
Repository identity: dinglebear-ai/soma
Package identity: npm:@dinglebear/soma
Service endpoint: deployment-dependent

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry metadata ↗
@dinglebear/soma
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
GitHub repository ↗
dinglebear-ai/soma
Repository reference; implementation attribution is not established for every document.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
dinglebear.ai/
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Framework setup

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Warning

Runtime/framework for custom MCP projects; `mcp` command exposes its own scaffold/operations, but it is not a finished domain server.
Distinguish framework scaffolding from installing a user-facing data connector.
Earlier review note retained for provenance; the V3 verified fields take precedence: Targeted 2026-10-13 re-research: Publisher supports npx -y @dinglebear/soma mcp; remote HTTP server has separate OAuth/bearer configuration.
Supported in publisher npm README; confirm local platform/prerequisites and never paste credentials as literals.
Prior reviewed safety note: Do not place orders, spend tokens, modify infrastructure or upload confidential files as a test.
Prior reviewed safety note: Do not invent a one-line reversal command.
Client unregister, package uninstall, data deletion, and OAuth/API token/wallet permissions are distinct.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Runtime/framework for custom MCP projects; `mcp` command exposes its own scaffold/operations, but it is not a finished domain server.
publisher sdk or product install · Publisher instructions
npx -y @dinglebear/soma mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Publisher: `npx -y @dinglebear/soma mcp` is its MCP runner; Soma is primarily a framework/scaffolding toolkit.
Check connection
Suggested check
Publisher `soma doctor` checks operator setup; inspect tools in client to verify MCP registration.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
For a Claude Code registration named `radar-799619b91886279f475afac90be9a07470af7191c78aefdd9a92198cc128bfa3`, run `claude mcp remove radar-799619b91886279f475afac90be9a07470af7191c78aefdd9a92198cc128bfa3`; otherwise remove the exact entry in the chosen MCP client settings and restart/reconnect. This client-host removal command is MCP100-composed from Claude Code lifecycle documentation, not a vendor-authored uninstall. With `npx`, a separate global package uninstall normally is unnecessary. Do not delete provider data or credentials by default.
Client unregister, package uninstall, data deletion, and OAuth/API token/wallet permissions are distinct.
Remove client registration · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide
claude mcp remove radar-799619b91886279f475afac90be9a07470af7191c78aefdd9a92198cc128bfa3

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Soma is a batteries-included RMCP runtime and scaffold rather than a single narrow service connector. Provider manifests or static Rust providers define business actions; Soma projects them across MCP/CLI/REST with validation/auth/observability and scaffold/export tooling.

Capability: Developer Tools
Resource type: Framework
Best fit: Runtime/scaffold for provider-backed Rust MCP products with shared auth, CLI/REST/HTTP MCP, plugins and generated contracts.

Representative uses

Run provider-backed MCP tools
Load provider manifests/WASM/scripts/OpenAPI/upstream MCP adapters
Expose generated REST/OpenAPI surfaces
Scaffold new MCP products
Use shared auth/OAuth/plugin runtime

Limitations

Actual data/write authority depends entirely on loaded providers.
Not intended as a public multi-tenant security boundary by itself.
Npm package is a launcher for verified native binary.
Single MCP tool dispatch hides a dynamic action catalog behind `action`.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Provider/runtime dependent.
Permissions: Whatever authority loaded providers declare; destructive actions can be gated by runtime policy.
Data handling: Local/runtime provider data handling varies by provider; Soma supplies shared auth/validation but does not replace upstream authorization.
Cost: self_hosted_or_provider_dependent
Risk and cautions: Framework can host high-authority providers; risk is configuration/provider-specific.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Provider-defined writes Scaffold/export local project state
Sensitive access: Provider credentials Potential local/remote service data
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Run provider-backed MCP tools; Load provider manifests/WASM/scripts/OpenAPI/upstream MCP adapters; Expose generated REST/OpenAPI surfaces; Scaffold new MCP products; Use shared auth/OAuth/plugin runtime.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y @dinglebear/soma mcp. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http, rest. Recorded environment-variable notes: SOMA_HOME; SOMA_PROVIDER_DIR; SOMA_API_URL (optional); SOMA_API_KEY (optional); RUST_LOG (optional). No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Supported native platform; GitHub CLI for launcher provenance verification where required. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Runtime/provider-dependent; credentials are kept out of tool-call arguments.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Provider-defined writes; Scaffold/export local project state. Recorded permission boundary: Whatever authority loaded providers declare; destructive actions can be gated by runtime policy.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Local/runtime provider data handling varies by provider; Soma supplies shared auth/validation but does not replace upstream authorization. Recorded sensitive-access context: Provider credentials; Potential local/remote service data.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Framework can host high-authority providers; risk is configuration/provider-specific. Actual data/write authority depends entirely on loaded providers. Not intended as a public multi-tenant security boundary by itself. Npm package is a launcher for verified native binary. Single MCP tool dispatch hides a dynamic action catalog behind `action`. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.