SRIFT — Watchlist | MCP100 Index

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Srift peer-to-peer file transfer and chat through MCP: Do transfer discovery and file delivery retain explicit destination consent without overstating the encryption audit?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Secure peer-to-peer file transfer and encrypted agent/human communications with local full-capability and hosted reduced-capability modes.

What we know

SRIFT provides local-first P2P transfer, encrypted chat and MCP tooling. The local daemon exposes filesystem-aware send/receive/session tools; the hosted endpoint exposes only the subset that does not require local filesystem access or local E2EE key material.

Maintenance / activity evidence

srift-transfer 4.3.0 published 2026-09-30T07:08:15.659Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Local mode can read/send local files and receive files into local paths; hosted mode is narrower. Writes: Send files; Receive/save files; Create/close sessions; Approve peers; Encrypted chat.
Authentication not yet verified.
Sensitive access: Local files, Session codes, Chat content, Peer metadata

Filesystem authority plus file exfiltration risk make local mode high-impact despite E2EE.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do transfer discovery and file delivery retain explicit destination consent without overstating the encryption audit?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Srift peer-to-peer file transfer and chat through MCP and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

Filesystem authority plus file exfiltration risk make local mode high-impact despite E2EE.
Local mode can read/send local files and receive files into local paths; hosted mode is narrower.
File/chat payloads are designed to be end-to-end encrypted; local path handling still exposes files to the local process.
Reviewed write actions: Send files; Receive/save files; Create/close sessions; Approve peers; Encrypted chat
Sensitive access: Local files, Session codes, Chat content, Peer metadata
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
Tool counts differ by local vs hosted mode and have changed across public docs/releases.
Local daemon has filesystem authority; hosted endpoint intentionally omits filesystem/E2EE-key operations.
Room/session codes are sensitive rendezvous secrets.
AgentNet is a separate/expanded tool surface and should not be conflated with core file-transfer MCP.
Public docs disagree on exact live tool counts; do not publish a fixed canonical count.

Original activity observations

srift-transfer 4.3.0 published 2026-09-30T07:08:15.659Z

Technical identity

npm/srift-transfer

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/srift-transfer ↗
Reviewed resource type: Gateway
Repository identity: srivardhan113/SRIFT-Open_Source
Package identity: npm:srift-transfer
Service endpoint: https://srift.app/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry metadata ↗
srift-transfer
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
GitHub repository ↗
srivardhan113/srift-open_source
Repository reference; implementation attribution is not established for every document.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
srift.app/mcp-file-transfer
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
srift.app/ai-agents
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
srift.app/about
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Gateway setup

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / configure gateway or CLI
Publisher instructions
Publisher-documented package/connection route; replace placeholders and verify host-specific syntax.
Publisher setup example · Claude Code only · Publisher instructions
claude mcp add srift -- npx -y srift-transfer mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Local stdio includes 15 tools; hosted alternative `claude mcp add --transport http srift-hosted https://srift.app/mcp` has 9 tools, not same feature surface.
Use correct transport and published host config. Never paste secrets in chat; server registration is separate from software installation.
Previously reviewed configuration / prerequisites: Never expose local daemon port publicly; keep it loopback/sidecar-local.
Previously reviewed configuration / prerequisites: Node.js 20+ for npm path or standalone binary
Check connection
Suggested check
Run srift doctor and confirm read-only client capabilities; do not transmit real files to test.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
If registered as `srift-transfer` in Claude Code, remove its exact client entry with `claude mcp remove srift-transfer`; for Cursor/Claude Desktop/Codex, remove the matching MCP entry in that host settings. This client removal is MCP100-composed, not a vendor uninstall instruction. Npx does not imply a global install; do not delete user data or revoke credentials implicitly.
Publisher install example registration name(s): srift. The supplied removal example applies only to an existing Claude Code registration named srift-transfer; it does not remove the differently named install example. Confirm the actual host entry before use.
Conditional host / package cleanup · Claude Code only · MCP100 composed guide · Review before use
```
claude mcp remove srift-transfer
```

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

SRIFT provides local-first P2P transfer, encrypted chat and MCP tooling. The local daemon exposes filesystem-aware send/receive/session tools; the hosted endpoint exposes only the subset that does not require local filesystem access or local E2EE key material.

Capability: Files & Knowledge
Resource type: Gateway
Best fit: Secure peer-to-peer file transfer and encrypted agent/human communications with local full-capability and hosted reduced-capability modes.

Representative uses

Create/join sessions
Send or receive files
Approve/reject/kick peers
Use encrypted chat/session state
Quick-share files through expiring links

Limitations

Tool counts differ by local vs hosted mode and have changed across public docs/releases.
Local daemon has filesystem authority; hosted endpoint intentionally omits filesystem/E2EE-key operations.
Room/session codes are sensitive rendezvous secrets.
AgentNet is a separate/expanded tool surface and should not be conflated with core file-transfer MCP.
Public docs disagree on exact live tool counts; do not publish a fixed canonical count.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Not documented in the reviewed sources
Permissions: Local mode can read/send local files and receive files into local paths; hosted mode is narrower.
Data handling: File/chat payloads are designed to be end-to-end encrypted; local path handling still exposes files to the local process.
Cost: free
Risk and cautions: Filesystem authority plus file exfiltration risk make local mode high-impact despite E2EE.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Send files Receive/save files Create/close sessions Approve peers Encrypted chat
Sensitive access: Local files Session codes Chat content Peer metadata
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Create/join sessions; Send or receive files; Approve/reject/kick peers; Use encrypted chat/session state; Quick-share files through expiring links.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y srift-transfer mcp. Recorded endpoint: https://srift.app/mcp. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http. Prerequisites: Node.js 20+ for npm path or standalone binary. Client notes: Never expose local daemon port publicly; keep it loopback/sidecar-local. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Local daemon needs no API token; hosted orchestration endpoint is zero-config/public for supported session tools.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Send files; Receive/save files; Create/close sessions; Approve peers; Encrypted chat. Recorded permission boundary: Local mode can read/send local files and receive files into local paths; hosted mode is narrower.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

File/chat payloads are designed to be end-to-end encrypted; local path handling still exposes files to the local process. Recorded sensitive-access context: Local files; Session codes; Chat content; Peer metadata.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Filesystem authority plus file exfiltration risk make local mode high-impact despite E2EE. Tool counts differ by local vs hosted mode and have changed across public docs/releases. Local daemon has filesystem authority; hosted endpoint intentionally omits filesystem/E2EE-key operations. Room/session codes are sensitive rendezvous secrets. AgentNet is a separate/expanded tool surface and should not be conflated with core file-transfer MCP. Public docs disagree on exact live tool counts; do not publish a fixed canonical count. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.