Vestige — Watchlist | MCP100 Index

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow storage and MCP-agent compatibility as the memory service changes

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Local auditable memory with signed/hashed write receipts and causal history

What we know

Local MCP memory system built around an append-only Strata log, exact-handle recall, causal walks and write receipts; optional HTTP/dashboard surfaces are available.

Maintenance / activity evidence

Observed Oct 4, 2026 (UTC)Merge pull request 439 from samvallad33/feat/operator-once-149

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Activity source · commits ↗Activity source · releases ↗

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Local memory-store operations; write gate controls admitted effects. Writes: Store/suppress memories; Project fenced-region writes with confirmation.
Bearer token for optional HTTP.
Sensitive access: Long-lived project memory

Strong local provenance/receipts help auditability, but durable memory may contain sensitive project decisions.

Security source · repository notice ↗Security source · policy file ↗

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

Popularity

634 repository stars

Stars observed Sep 25, 2026.

Preserve any already-reviewed adoption metrics in MCP100. Batch 4 did not refresh package downloads because the package-stats provider had insufficient credits.

All limitations / Review context

Which memory persistence and MCP connection modes remain supported?

The bounded assessment reviewed the official README, repository notices, security policy path, and security page for known material public-tracking blockers. No such blocker was identified. This is a public-tracking assessment, not an installation safety certification.

Strong local provenance/receipts help auditability, but durable memory may contain sensitive project decisions.
Local memory-store operations; write gate controls admitted effects.
Bearer token for optional HTTP.
Default 4.x release operates locally; memory persists in append-only log.
Reviewed write actions: Store/suppress memories; Project fenced-region writes with confirmation
Sensitive access: Long-lived project memory
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
No independent runtime, installation, or comprehensive security audit was performed.
No installation, runtime, client matrix, or complete tool-contract audit was performed in this review.
Current 4.x behavior differs materially from older v3 docs/packages.
HTTP should remain loopback or protected with bearer/origin controls.

Original activity observations

2026-10-04T01:14:27Z: Merge pull request 439 from samvallad33/feat/operator-once-149

Technical identity

github.com/samvallad33/vestige

Exact implementation source: https://github.com/samvallad33/vestige ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Repository identity: samvallad33/vestige
Service endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:3928

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 6, 2026

GitHub repository ↗
samvallad33/vestige
Recorded repository material and project history.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Install signed Vestige release first using publisher installer; then register `vestige-mcp` as the memory server. Operator Lite is a separate execution gate, not required for memory MCP.
register codex mcp · Publisher instructions
codex mcp add vestige -- vestige-mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Memory server: publisher signed-release installer installs vestige-mcp binary to ~/.local/bin; then register with `codex mcp add vestige -- vestige-mcp` or publisher Claude Code command. Operator Lite is an independent PreToolUse hook; do not install it as a prerequisite for memory MCP.
Check connection
Suggested check
Confirm vestige-mcp binary on PATH and list MCP tools, without writing memory.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
Suggested check
To remove the Operator Lite hook, consult `python3 ~/.operator/gate --help` or its operator-lite documentation for the exact uninstall workflow; remove the installed hook from Claude Code settings and disable the local gate. Vestige's signed log binaries are separate; do not delete the append-only memory store automatically.
Client unregistration, program uninstall, persistent-data deletion, and credential revocation must be treated separately.

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Local MCP memory system built around an append-only Strata log, exact-handle recall, causal walks and write receipts; optional HTTP/dashboard surfaces are available.

Capability: Files & Knowledge
Resource type: MCP Server
Industry: Software & Technology
Best fit: Local auditable memory with signed/hashed write receipts and causal history

Representative uses

Store durable agent memories
Recall by exact handle/tag
Walk causal links from failures
Verify/replay write receipts

Limitations

Current 4.x behavior differs materially from older v3 docs/packages.
HTTP should remain loopback or protected with bearer/origin controls.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Bearer token for optional HTTP.
Permissions: Local memory-store operations; write gate controls admitted effects.
Data handling: Default 4.x release operates locally; memory persists in append-only log.
Cost: free
Risk and cautions: Strong local provenance/receipts help auditability, but durable memory may contain sensitive project decisions.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Store/suppress memories Project fenced-region writes with confirmation
Sensitive access: Long-lived project memory
Risk level: moderate

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-06. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Store durable agent memories; Recall by exact handle/tag; Walk causal links from failures; Verify/replay write receipts.

What setup and authentication are documented?

A complete connection procedure is not verified. Recorded endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:3928. Recorded transport: stdio, streamable_http. These facts do not supply missing installation commands, credentials or a verified authentication procedure. Authentication: Local stdio; bearer token for HTTP when enabled.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Store/suppress memories; Project fenced-region writes with confirmation. Recorded permission boundary: Local memory-store operations; write gate controls admitted effects.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

Default 4.x release operates locally; memory persists in append-only log. Recorded sensitive-access context: Long-lived project memory.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

Strong local provenance/receipts help auditability, but durable memory may contain sensitive project decisions. Current 4.x behavior differs materially from older v3 docs/packages. HTTP should remain loopback or protected with bearer/origin controls. No independent runtime, installation, or comprehensive security audit was performed.

Is this an official MCP?

Sam Vallad is listed as Community implementation in MCP100’s current evidence.