Workix MCP — Watchlist

MCP100 Assessment

Watchlist / Tracking

Why we’re tracking it

Follow-up value is specific to Workix opportunity search and listing management: Do external-board credentials remain local while catalog writes and applications retain their own approval boundaries?

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Documentation review; complete setup workflow not independently tested

Best fit

Search Workix/freelance opportunities and manage listings/proposal workflows with credentials kept locally for external boards.

What we know

Local MCP for Workix shared catalog plus freelance-board adapters. Public search is keyless against Workix; authenticated writes use a Workix agent key, while third-party board credentials stay in the local process.

Maintenance / activity evidence

@workix/mcp 1.0.0 published 2026-08-10T23:43:19.912Z

Tracking evidence observed Oct 5, 2026. These dated signals do not establish current maintenance. Reviewed enrichment confidence: high.

Verification gaps / watch-outs

Installation and comprehensive security have not been independently audited.
Catalog reads plus own-listing and potentially application/proposal actions. Writes: Create/update listings; Potential proposal/apply actions when explicit and authorized.
Workix agent key and optional third-party board credentials.
Sensitive access: Freelance account credentials, Application/proposal content, Work history

External applications can create real professional commitments; preserve explicit human approval.

Full authority, access and evidence limits are available in Review context and Access & risk.

All limitations / Review context

Do external-board credentials remain local while catalog writes and applications retain their own approval boundaries?

The bounded review of the publisher's documented Workix opportunity search and listing management and release notices identified no disclosed material condition preventing an accurately scoped public tracking entry. The resource's operational permissions remain uncertainty; this assessment does not certify installation safety.

External applications can create real professional commitments; preserve explicit human approval.
Catalog reads plus own-listing and potentially application/proposal actions.
Workix agent key and optional third-party board credentials.
External board credentials remain local, but opportunity data and Workix writes hit respective platforms.
Reviewed write actions: Create/update listings; Potential proposal/apply actions when explicit and authorized
Sensitive access: Freelance account credentials, Application/proposal content, Work history
Installation, client compatibility and comprehensive security have not been independently audited. Authentication and access depend on the configured services.
Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited.
Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use.
Publisher documentation explicitly warns that compromising its dynamic adapter registry could execute code in clients; this is a disclosed conditional trust boundary, not evidence of a confirmed compromise. Prefer controlled/bundled adapters before use.
Tool inventory, client matrix and permissions completeness were not requirements for this Radar tracking review.
Many board adapters depend on third-party credentials and can be brittle.
Project explicitly says never submit proposals/applies without human approval.
npm may lag the source tree; source install is recommended.
Some boards may forbid automation under their terms.

Original activity observations

@workix/mcp 1.0.0 published 2026-08-10T23:43:19.912Z

Technical identity

npm/@workix/mcp

Exact implementation source: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@workix/mcp ↗
Reviewed resource type: MCP Server
Repository identity: facetoplace/Workix
Package identity: npm:@workix/mcp

Evidence & Sources

Evidence basis: Recorded source evidence
Setup runtime verification: Not independently runtime-tested by MCP100 for this setup workflow.

Reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · Latest source observation Oct 8, 2026

Package registry ↗
@workix/mcp
Recorded package identity, distribution or download evidence.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.
Evidence source ↗
workix.co/agent
Source material retained for this review.
Includes references whose attribution is not established.

Setup · Watchlist

Install & Agents

Publisher instructions.

Source evidence observed Oct 14, 2026.

Additional setup details required — see the specific gaps below.

Install / connect
Publisher instructions
Publisher recommends clone and npm install/build, npm can lag Git; adapter modules downloaded as executable code at runtime.
publisher documented install or connect · Publisher instructions
npx -y @workix/mcp
Configure / authenticate
MCP100 setup guide
Publisher recommends cloned repo install/build path; npm package may lag upstream. Downloaded code adapters execute in process; trust registry/hosts and do not trigger remote code download solely for verification.
Check connection
Suggested check
User-side suggested check (not executed): inspect registered tools/connection and perform publisher-supported read-only status/list operations. Do not send, purchase, publish, delete, sign, trade or alter data as a smoke test.
Remove / uninstall / revoke
MCP100 setup guide
Generic client guidance (not publisher-specific uninstall): unregister MCP entry in the chosen client. If installed globally, remove the npm package separately. Revoke provider access separately through account controls, where supported. This does not erase local data or revoke funds/credentials automatically.
Unregister the named MCP entry from the actual host separately from removing a global npm install; no claim that either revokes remote credentials.
Remove local stored keys/tokens and revoke or rotate corresponding provider authorization using documented provider account controls if available; exact procedure not verified for this package. Wallet private keys cannot be revoked.

Official Documentation & Sources

What it does

Local MCP for Workix shared catalog plus freelance-board adapters. Public search is keyless against Workix; authenticated writes use a Workix agent key, while third-party board credentials stay in the local process.

Capability: Productivity & Collaboration
Resource type: MCP Server
Industry: Human Resources, Professional Services
Best fit: Search Workix/freelance opportunities and manage listings/proposal workflows with credentials kept locally for external boards.

Representative uses

Search Workix projects/roles/orders/performers
Manage own listings
Search external freelance boards
Prepare proposal/application workflows

Limitations

Many board adapters depend on third-party credentials and can be brittle.
Project explicitly says never submit proposals/applies without human approval.
npm may lag the source tree; source install is recommended.
Some boards may forbid automation under their terms.

Reviewed access

Access & risk

Review the exact access boundary before connecting this MCP to accounts, credentials, or sensitive data.

Authentication: Workix agent key and optional third-party board credentials.
Permissions: Catalog reads plus own-listing and potentially application/proposal actions.
Data handling: External board credentials remain local, but opportunity data and Workix writes hit respective platforms.
Cost: mixed
Risk and cautions: External applications can create real professional commitments; preserve explicit human approval.

Access scope and cautions

Write actions: Create/update listings Potential proposal/apply actions when explicit and authorized
Sensitive access: Freelance account credentials Application/proposal content Work history
Risk level: high

FAQ

Based on reviewed evidence as of 2026-10-08. Watchlist tracking is not a recommendation or a security certification.

Which tasks are documented for this implementation?

The reviewed tasks include: Search Workix projects/roles/orders/performers; Manage own listings; Search external freelance boards; Prepare proposal/application workflows.

What setup and authentication are documented?

Recorded installation/entrypoint step: npx -y @workix/mcp. Recorded transport: stdio. Recorded environment-variable notes: WORKIX_API (optional/default https://workix.co); WORKIX_AGENT_KEY (writes); board-specific credentials such as Upwork/FreelanceHunt/Kwork. No configuration values are supplied here. Prerequisites: Node >=22.5; MCP client. These are the documented setup details, not a claim that installation or client compatibility was independently tested. Authentication: Public search keyless; Workix writes use `wix_` agent key; third-party board credentials stay local. A demo or keyless description is not independently verified read-only authority. Check the documented tool permissions rather than inferring authority from that label.

Can it modify data or perform write operations?

Documented write actions include: Create/update listings; Potential proposal/apply actions when explicit and authorized. Recorded permission boundary: Catalog reads plus own-listing and potentially application/proposal actions.

What data-handling boundary should I consider?

External board credentials remain local, but opportunity data and Workix writes hit respective platforms. Recorded sensitive-access context: Freelance account credentials; Application/proposal content; Work history.

What limitations and risks should I check before use?

External applications can create real professional commitments; preserve explicit human approval. Many board adapters depend on third-party credentials and can be brittle. Project explicitly says never submit proposals/applies without human approval. npm may lag the source tree; source install is recommended. Some boards may forbid automation under their terms. Runtime behavior, dependencies and undisclosed vulnerabilities were not independently audited. Documented tool authority and any remote data handling must be checked before installation or use. Publisher documentation explicitly warns that compromising its dynamic adapter registry could execute code in clients; this is a disclosed conditional trust boundary, not evidence of a confirmed compromise. Prefer controlled/bundled adapters before use.