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Side-by-side MCP evidence comparison
Evidence fieldStackQL MCPShortlist candidateTerraform MCPMCP100 Recommended
Task fit
Best for
  • Read-only cloud inventory and governed infrastructure queries
  • Teams that can enforce read_only or safe mode with audit logging
  • Connect compatible AI clients to HashiCorp's documented MCP capabilities.
Not ideal for
  • Unattended infrastructure mutation without approval and audit
  • Organizations that cannot tightly scope cloud credentials by provider/account
  • Users who need a fully reviewed MCP100 recommendation today
Avoid when
  • You would run full_access with broad cloud credentials
  • You cannot review audit logs or enforce tool allowlists
  • Permissions, credentials, and connected data cannot be tested with least privilege
Provenance
Provenance details

First-party MCP

reviewed-detail:stackql-mcp · Publisher source ↗

First-party MCP

HashiCorp · Publisher source ↗

Maintenance
Maintenance details

Repo: Not documented

Package: Not documented

Repo: Aug 14, 2026

Package: Not documented

Popularity evidence
GitHub starsNot documented

1,534

GitHub stars · checked 2026-09-25T18:35:00Z

Client coverage
Client coverage detailsNot documented
Claude Code✓ Local stdio
Claude Desktop✓ Local stdio
Codex✓ Local stdio
VS Code✓ Local stdio
Cursor✓ Local stdio
OpenCode✓ Local stdio
Client coverage noteLocal stdio runs on your computer. Streamable HTTP connects to a remotely hosted MCP server.
Access and data
AuthenticationUses provider credentials supplied to StackQL; authentication varies by cloud provider. The MCP transport itself can be stdio/HTTP/TLS depending on deployment.HCP Terraform/TFE API tokens; remote client may pass per-user TFE_TOKEN
CostOpen-source; cloud provider usage and hosting costs apply.HCP/TFE/run costs may apply
PermissionsServer mode controls mutation: read_only refuses writes; safe/default requires approval; delete_safe and full_access expand privileges. enabled_tools can narrow exposure.HCP Terraform/TFE RBAC
Data handlingCan read cloud inventory/configuration and, when permitted, mutate or invoke provider lifecycle operations. Audit logs can record calls.registry/HCP/TFE data may reach connected MCP client/LLM
Limitations
Tradeoffs
  • Default safe/read-only modes materially improve control
  • The same server can still become a powerful cloud control plane when escalated
  • Publisher attribution supports discovery, but does not replace an independent permissions and usability review.
Risk contextHigh. In full or writable modes the server can change cloud infrastructure. Keep read_only/safe defaults, least-privileged provider credentials, and audit logging.stdio/localhost defaults; strict CORS; TLS verify on; rate limits; ENABLE_TF_OPERATIONS=false by default
Evidence date
Editorial review2026-09-112026-07-24
Candidate evidence2026-09-11T00:00:00.000Z2026-09-25T18:35:00Z

Popularity, maintenance, fit, permissions, and client support are independent evidence fields.

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